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Issues in Providing Agricultural Services 
in Developing Countries 
I. Introduction 
The Agency for International Development (AI.D.) and other donors have spent 
substantial amounts during the past three decades to support agricultural development in 
developing countries. A synthesis paper on investments in agriculture is being produced that 
will identify the conditions under which agricultural investments in five major areas have 
been successful or unsuccessful in contributing to broad based agricultural growth in 
developing countries. For purposes of this study, agriculture is defined as those activities 
traditionally funded under Section 103 of the Foreign Assistance Act in support of rural 
production as well as simply agriculture. The funded activities are organized into five main 
sub-sectors: 
1. 'Asset Distribution and Access 
2. Planning and Policy Analysis 
3. Technology Development and Diffusion 
4. Rural Infrastructure 
5. Agricultural Services 
A paper on each of these sub-sectors will be written as input for the synthesis paper. 
The intent of the synthesis paper is to help AI.D. obtain a clearer understanding of the 
results of these investments and, in so doing, to assist the Agency's strategic decision-making 
regarding priorities for future agricultural programs. Each paper is to address six key issues 
for AI.D. They can be stated as follows for this paper: 
1. Are investments in agricultural services appropriate at all stages of development, or 
are they most appropriate during the early or later stages of growth? 
2. Has successful agricultural development occurred in the absence of investments in 
agricultural services? 
3. What was the rate of return to investments in agricultural services? Did investments 
in complementary subsectors pave the way for these returns? 
4. Is the private or public sector best suited to invest in agriculture services? 
5. Among the various agencies or organizations that implement agricultural activities, 
are some better suited than others in providing agricultural services? 
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6. Does the U.S. have a comparative advantage in assisting m the provision of 
agricultural services in developing countries? 
The present paper addresses the agricultural services sub-sector which is defined to 
include agricultural credit and marketing services, including both inputs and outputs. For 
the purposes of the paper, these services will not include rural infrastructure, research and 
extension, planning and policy analysis, or asset distribution and access. Each of these is 
covered in one of the other four papers. Agricultural services will be defined as those 
related to production agriculture and will not cover some special types of services such as 
credit and marketing services for m.icroenterprises, or export credit. Credit services will 
include both loans and deposits. Marketing is defined as the system of markets and related 
institutions which organize the economic activity of the food and fiber sector of the econo-
my. This system involves information flows, institutional arrangements, infrastructure, 
organizations, and entrepreneurial or risk taking activity. 
This desk study is a review of literature to establish the state of knowledge about 
agriculture s~:r,vices in developing countries throughout the world. The study uses the 
evaluation synthesis methodology, which is designed for the "rapid production of information 
relevant to a specific program and the analysis of large amounts of sometimes conflicting 
information on the topic" (GAO 1992). Documents from several major international donor 
organizations and the academic literature of books, journal articles and working papers, and 
the past experience of the authors are the major information sources used in the study. 
The next two sections of this report discuss issues in providing agricultural services 
and a theoretical framework defining the impact of agricultural services. This is followed 
by three sections presenting an evaluation of rural financial services, agricultural marketing 
services and agricultural input marketing services, respectively. The last section discusses 
the conclusions and implications for future AID investments in agricultural services. 
II. Issues in Providing Agricultural Services 
A Rural financial services 
Agricultural credit has been viewed as being essential for the expansion of food 
production, the adoption of new farming technology, and for the improvement in rural 
income distribution. Many developing countries and donor agencies were preoccupied 
during the 1960s, 70s, and 80s with expanding agricultural production, especially food grains. 
The Green Revolution offered hope for breaking through existing production constraints. 
But the new technologies usually required an expansion in cash outlays by farmers to 
purchase inputs including new seed varieties, chemical fertilizers, and pesticides. For large 
farms, this also implied expanded costs for hired labor. Many of the food grain producers 
were small farmers whose active involvement was considered crucial to tap the new produc-
tion potential. An expansion in credit for purchasing the new factors of production was 
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considered key, especially for small producers in light of these high cash costs. Neither the 
existing informal lenders nor the established formal financial institutions were considered 
able or willing to provide reasonably priced credit to meet small farmer needs. This view 
led governments and donors to conclude that credit market failure existed and could be 
corrected by government intervention through selective policies and projects. This view 
provided donors with the rationale to support special credit programs, often at subsidized 
interest rates, to speed the adoption of technology and to expand food production. (See, 
for example, the rationale given for ADB credit projects in ADB 1993 and the discussion 
about ALD. by Lieberson et al. 1985). 
Two types of credit projects were used to support agricultural development. The first 
can be referred to as a "'credit-component• project involving a production package in which 
credit is tied to the adoption of a package of inputs. Credit is viewed like another input 
necessary for adoption of the technology. The production packages often specified the 
amount of seed, fertilizer and credit that each farmer should receive per hectare of crop 
produced. The implicit assumption was that either the farmer had no savings, or was 
unwilling to c.ommit them to the new, more risky technology. The second kind of "'credit-
only" project assumed that reasonable input supplies were available and credit delivery 
institutions existed, but they needed special incentives to lend to socially desirable groups 
such as small farmers. This type of project targeted specific classes of borrowers for loans 
but left to the lenders the actual allocation of funds. 
Both types of projects suffered serious limitations as revealed in subsequent evalua-
tions and research. They assumed that the farmers would perceive the new technology to 
be profitable but they failed to recognize that credit is fungible so that it can be allocated 
by borrowers to the use with the highest expected return which may not be the new 
technology. Moreover, loans may simply substitute for the borrowers' own funds or informal 
finance so the additional use of new inputs may be much less than expected. Evidence from 
some areas of rapid adoption of Green Revolution technology showed that fanners were 
willing to use their own savings when they were convinced that the new technology was 
highly profitable. Furthermore, many projects paid little attention to the sustainability of 
the financial institutions that supplied credit. Often the projects collapsed when the donor 
funds were spent. This experience has focused increased attention in recent years on the 
profitability of new innovations, the secure supply of inexpensive inputs, and the viability of 
financial institutions serving agriculture. 
B. Agricultural marketing services 
As countries begin the economic growth process, many changes can be identified that 
lead to an increase in demand for marketing services. Higher incomes and growing popula-
tions mean that consumers will demand more and more marketing services that increase 
convenience and reduce preparation time, such as cutting and slicing, frozen, canned, 
packaging, oven ready, and microwaveable. This occurs because the income elasticity of 
demand for marketing services is higher than for the raw material produced on farms. In 
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addition, as per capita income increases, the composition of demand for food changes to 
increased consumption of products with a higher income elasticity of demand and reduced 
consumption of foods with a low income elasticity of demand. These changes typically mean 
increased consumption of products such as fruits and vegetables, meat, dairy and processed 
products and decreased consumption of staples such as potatoes, cassava, and rice. More 
marketing services are required for these high valued perishable products. Among 
developed countries the income elasticity of demand for cereals is -0.22, compared to + 0.25 
and + 0.38 for high value foods such as meat, eggs, and fruit and vegetables. In developing 
countries, the income elasticity of demand for cereals is estimated to be +0.16 and from 
+ 0.61 to + 1.00 for the high value foods (Sarma and Yeung 1985 and Islam 1990]. 
Increasing urbanization also leads to an increase in demand for marketing services 
as populations relocate from rural areas to urban areas. Urbanization through time leads 
to a population that changes from primarily rural to primarily urban. This urbanization 
means major changes in the marketing system as more marketing services are required to 
transport, store, package, and process large quantities of foods from production centers to 
consumption .centers. 
Consumers, producers and policy makers frequently view marketing services as unpro-
ductive and too costly. The marketing system is viewed as charging the consumer too much 
and paying the farmer too little for the goods and services provided. The value added from 
marketing is more difficult for consumers, producers and policy makers to comprehend. 
One of the reasons for this view is that marketing provides intangible services through the 
creation of time, place and form utilities rather than the production of a tangible good as 
in farm production or manufacturing. 
Whether markets are competitive or exploitative of consumers and/ or producers 
depends in large measure upon their structure and performance. Competitive markets, 
generally viewed as having a large number of firms, lead to desirable results in terms of 
economic efficiency and returns to resources. Monopolistic markets, generally viewed as 
one firm or few firms, lead to inefficiency and excess returns to economic resources. In 
developing countries the lack of competitive markets and market failure have frequently 
been a justification used by governments to intervene in markets. A common form of 
intervention has been the creation of government owned monopolies that were intended to 
improve market competitiveness but, the intended objectives were not achieved. 
Agriculture, perhaps more than any other business, faces enormous production and 
price risk due to the inelastic nature of the demand and supply and the effect of natural 
disasters and weather variability on production. Reduction of price and production risk is 
an important policy objective of governments in developing and developed countries. 
Governments intervene in markets to stabilize prices and production for the stated benefit 
of producers and consumers. Large government purchase and storage programs for grains, 
and sometimes other products, were created to guarantee minimum prices to producers and 
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low, stable prices for consumers. These programs encounter many problems of high costs 
and inefficiency that will be discussed in the marketing services section of this report. 
C. Agricultural input marketing services 
As countries develop, farms become larger in size, more capital and labor intensive, 
more dependent on the market place for the purchase of inputs and the sale of outputs. 
Providing agricultural inputs in a timely and low cost manner becomes increasingly 
important. Agricultural input services in the form of improved seeds, fertilizer, and 
machinery, separately or as a package, have been widely used in developing countries to 
modernize agriculture and improve productivity per unit of land and labor. 
The provision of agricultural input services accounts for a major portion of the 
project assistance of many donor organizations including AlD., IDB, World Bank, and 
others. As discussed in the rural finance section. the objective of many donor credit projects 
is to finance the farmer purchase of these input packages, especially small farmer financing. 
Much of the ~put supply assistance is through commodity import programs, especially for 
fertilizer and to a lesser extent imported feeds and protein for livestock. Significant but 
much smaller amounts of funds have been allocated by donors to seed, livestock, animal 
traction, and machinery input service projects. 
The most successful example of innovation and technology is with the provision of 
Green Revolution seed varieties and the related inputs. Developing the appropriate techno-
logy is an issue to be discussed in another report, but how to deliver the technology to 
producers most effectively is an issue here. Many public sector parastatals, a few private 
sector options and some combinations of the two have been used to attempt to deliver the 
input services to farmers. Most parastatal agricultural input marketing services have had 
very mixed results because of the high cost, inefficiency, poor service and political 
interference. Input delivery services frequently have problems of inappropriate technology, 
lack of profitability or untimely delivery. For example, in discussing seed projects in 
Tanzania and Cameroon, one report concludes that the large amounts of funds spent on 
those projects is another example of "technological optimism" regarding the returns to the 
investment when the funds would have had a higher payoff allocated to research to develop 
better local varieties (Johnston, Hoben, Dijkennan, and Jaeger 1987, p 160}. 
III. Theoretical Framework Defining the Impact of Agricultural Services 
The purpose of this section is to present a simple analytical framework for the 
analysis that follows about the relationship between investments in agricultural services and 
agricultural development. This framework is similar to that used implicitly or explicitly in 
many government and donor projects. There has been a significant change in views over 
the past 20 years, however, so this section will first present the traditional views followed 
by some of the newer ones. 
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A Traditional Views of Providing Agricultural Services 
1. Rationale for special credit projects 
The traditional view of agricultural credit was closely linked to early views about the 
process of technological change and the way that cash or liquidity constraints were perceived 
to affect farm household resource allocation (David and Meyer 1980). The basic prinClples 
can be described most simply by using a production function as shown in Figure 1. Crop 
yields per unit of land are plotted on the vertical axis and fertilizer inputs per unit of land 
are plotted on the horizontal axis. All other factors of production are assumed constant. 
The production function plots expected crop yields as fertilizer use increases. Two 
production functions are shown. The lower one refers to fertilizer response for traditional 
crop varieties; the higher one plots what might be expected by using new varieties created 
specifically to be more responsive to chemical fertilizers. 
The demand for fertilizer is determined by three factors: the price of the output or 
crop, the cost,qf fertilizer, and the production technology (Norton and Alwang 1993). Profit 
maximization requires that a fanner should increase the use of fertilizer up to the point 
where the cost of the marginal input (which is its price in a competitive market) equals the 
value of the marginal product of the input (the output price times the marginal product of 
the input). The price ratio lines, Px/P Y' reflect the relationship between fertilizer and crop 
prices faced by the farmer. The profit maximizing or optimum use of fertilizer on the 
traditional variety is at point B with Xa units of fertilizer applied per unit of land, or at point 
y with xl units with the new variety. The importance of the productivity increase of new 
technology is reflected in the increase in optimum fertilizer use with no change in price 
ratio. The Figure could have been drawn so that a reduction in the relative price of 
fertilizer would have been required in order to induce farmers to use the new variety. This 
new price relationship could also induce the development and adoption of newer varieties 
giving an even larger fertilizer response (Hayami and Ruttan 1985). 
The traditional view of credit "need" arose because of a concern about the ability of 
farmers to pay the cash costs implied in buying and optimum levels of fertilizer. If a farmer 
had cash to buy less than ~ units of fertilizer, then production and farm income would not 
be maximized. Both the farmer and the nation would lose. Furthermore, it might be 
rational for the farmer to adopt no new technology. It was believed that market failure 
existed in credit markets because formal lenders were too risk averse to make socially 
desirable loans to farmers, and informal lenders charged usuriously high interest rates. This 
understanding of the problem led to the creation of integrated production packages in which 
credit was treated as an input along with seed, fertilizer, and other inputs. The credit was 
provided through special credit lines or special institutions and was often supervised to 
insure that the farmer properly used the technology and credit. Similar types of arguments 
were made to rationalize projects designed to provide farmers with medium and long-term 
credit to purchase larger capital inputs. Fertilizer and interest rate subsidies were justified 
as necessary to temporarily increase profitability in the early stages of the adoption process 
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when farmers were just beginning to learn the value of the new technology. Later, interest 
subsidies were rationalized as a way to compensate farmers for the urban bias of many food 
price and wage polices. It was also expected that credit targeted for special classes of 
borrowers, such as small farmers or the rural poor, would help improve income distribution 










Fertilizer use per hectare 
Figure 1. Production Function Relating Fertilizer Use to Crop Yields 
u. Impact of a reduction in marketing costs 
Marketing costs can be analyzed within this same framework. Lower marketing costs 
increase the net price that farmers receive for their output. A reduction in the marketing 
costs is reflected by a clockwise rotation of the price ratio line in Figure 1. Such a 
reduction, therefore, would enable farmers to increase production by moving along the 
production function to a higher level of output (toward points C or Z in Figure 1). The 
benefits obtained from reducing marketing costs will be divided between lower prices to the 
consumer and higher prices paid to the producers depending upon the price elasticities of 
demand and supply for the product. The more inelastic the supply relative to the demand 
the greater the share of the marketing cost reduction that will be passed along to the 
producer in the form of better prices. In terms of the producer, a reduction in marketing 
costs may increase the output price or reduce the input price. 
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Several factors may lead to a reduction in marketing costs that will improve the price 
ratios for the individual producer. Any investments that improve pricing or operating 
efficiency in agricultural markets will, ceteris paribus, reduce marketing costs. For exampie, 
infrastructure investments that reduce costs of transportation and communication., legal and 
institutional reforms that promote more efficient marketing, information services that 
improve firm decision making, new technologies that reduce costs of processing and 
handling, can all reduce marketing costs. 
As incomes increase, consumers demand more marketing services such as increased 
processing, packaging, and handling and the associated marketing costs will increase causing 
the farmers' share of the consumer food dollar to decline. These costs consist mainly of 
physical distribution costs, service costs and profits. As can be seen in Table 1, marketing 
costs vary substantially by commodity. They also vary by country for the same commodity 
due to differences in income, geography, infrastructure and marketing systems, for example. 
One study found that marketing costs are larger in several African countries than in Asian 
countries because of higher transport costs due to poorer infrastructure and larger country 
size [Ahmed and Rustagi 1987] . 
. '
TABLE 1. Marketing costs and margins for major food items in selected less developed countries 












Marketing costs and margins as Cost items as percentage 










9-18 (transport costs) 
9-18 (milling costs) 
12-24 (other costs such as assembly and retailing) 
The largest part of the gross margin was taken up 
by the baker's and retailer's margin 
Major cost items were assembly and milling costs 
5-11- retail costs (lower income countries) 
10-23- retail costs (higher income countries) 
Assembly costs 
Slaughtering costs 
10-15 (retailing costs) 
10-15 (assembly and wholesaling costs) 
20-30 (retailing costs) 
60-70 (assembly and wholesale costs including 
transport) 
In the U.S. the fanners' share of consumer food expenditures has declined steadily 
through time and is currently about 25 percent for food consumed at home and 16 percent 
for away from home consumption [Rhodes 1993]. In many developing countries the farmers' 
share is higher than in the U.S. ( 40 to 50 percent of the consumer expenditure) but the 
same declining trend can be observed. This declining farmer share of consumer food 
expenditure can be expected to continue as countries develop. It is important to bear in 
mind that a declining trend in this share does not mean that the marketing system is 
inefficient or that farming is unprofitable. Technical progress that increases productivity 
generally will result in declining real prices per unit of output. However, much government 
intervention in markets is predicated upon the "high marketing costs" and declining farm 
share only to find out that the services must be performed by someone and that 
governments frequently perform the services at higher cost than the private sector. 
ill. Traditional view of market failure and government intervention in 
input and output markets 
Prior t9, the 1980s, market failure was viewed as a primary justification for govern-
ment intervention in agricultural credit, output and input markets. The continued poverty, 
income inequalities, hunger, food shortages, low productivity and lack of modernization of 
agriculture as well as other sectors of the economy were considered as evidence that 
markets had failed to produce the desired economic growth in many countries of Africa, 
Asia and Latin America [Reusse 1987]. Problems of small farmer access to markets, slow 
adoption of new technology and high marketing costs were cited as indicators of input and 
output market failures [World Bank 1990 and 1991, and Wolgin 1990]. 
The market failure view was especially popular among the socialist oriented 
governments in power at that time because it complemented much of what the leaders 
wanted to do to reform the economy. They thought government could do much better than 
the market place at running the economy to achieve economic growth. These governments, 
often assisted by ALD. and other donors, proceeded to intervene in markets in a wide 
variety of ways to correct the perceived failures of the market economies in their countries. 
In many countries the degree of government intervention reached every sector of the 
economy. Governments nationalized many of the marketing functions in domestic and 
foreign trade in sectors such as agriculture, manufacturing, banking, insurance, and housing. 
1bis was often done through the creation of parastatal companies that had monopoly control 
of the entire sector. The governments passed laws and regulations to control prices, interest 
rates, exchange rates, rental rates, marketing margins, product shipments, etc. All this 
government intervention in markets created a rigid, centralized, bureaucratic system that had 
great difficulty operating its ''businesses" efficiently [World Bank 1991]. 
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B. New Views of Providing Agricultural Services 
1. New view of rural financial markets 
The traditional view of agricultural credit came under criticism as early as the 1973 
AI.D. Spring Review of Small Farmer Credit (Donald 1976). The early studies suggested 
that the special small farmer credit projects did not have the expected impact, and there was 
evidence of unexpected negative consequences such as the concentration of loans and a 
weakening of financial institutions involved in the projects. These and other criticisms that 
are discussed in detail below gave rise to what is now called the new view of rural financial 
markets. 
The next important comprehensive attack of the traditional view and the appearance 
of some ideas that eventually became known as the "new view'' occurred in the Colloquium 
on Rural Finance cosponsored by ALD. and the World Bank in Washington D.C. in 1981. 
The background papers and results of the Colloquium discussions were published in Adams, 
Graham and '{on Pischke (1984). Papers by Adams and Graham (1981), and Adams and 
Vogel (1986),' the book by Von Pischke, Adams and Donald (1983) and the book by Schmidt 
and Kropp (1987) made important contributions to developing the new view. Many 
subsequent publications have challenged aspects of the new view and raised additional issues 
about the problems of financial marketS in developing countries. 
The new view argued for a fundamental change in the way that governmentS and 
donors use finance to support agricultural development and how credit projects should be 
evaluated. The changes included doing much less targeting of loans, more flexible interest 
rates for loans and deposits, more emphasis on deposit mobilization, less concessionary lines 
of rediscounting from central banks, and more attempts to reduce transaction costs for 
borrowers rather than trying to lower interest rates on loans. It was also argued that 
projects should be less concerned about the difficult task of measuring impact on borrowers, 
but rather focus on how projects contribute to the viability of financial institutions and the 
performance of financial markets. 
Although there are still debates between advocates of the traditional and the new 
view, the new view generally has prevailed. Many subsidized agricultural credit projects 
have disappeared, there is less targeting of loans, interest rates are more flexible, more 
emphasis is placed on deposit mobilization _and the efficiency of financial institutions, and 
projects are evaluated on their contribution to the development of sound financial 
institutions and markets. Studies and evaluations spend less effort on measuring impact on 
borrowers and more attention to analyzing the performance of the financial system. More 
attention is being given to complex design issues in developing policies, technologies, and 
organizations that can survive and be efficient when serving farmers in the difficult 
circumstances found in developing countries. 
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u. New view of government failure in input and output markets and 
creation of open competitive markets 
The record of government failure and general dissatisfaction with government 
intervention in input and output markets is readily observed by the comprehensive changes 
being implemented in many countries today. Many of these changes are described in the 
next several sections and more generally in the development literature cited at the end of 
the present report [Krueger 1978 and World Bank 1991]. 
State intervention in agricultural marketing systems bas generally failed to contribute 
to sustained economic growth and failed to solve the problems of poverty, food shortages, 
low productivity, etc. that plague many developing countries. Most of the government 
created parastatal "businesses" failed to perform and are now in various stages of bankruptcy 
and closure. In several cases such as Nicaragua and Mozambique, the countries have lost 
15 years or more of economic growth and are poorer relative to other countries than in the 
early 1970s. Other countries such as Uganda and Ghana had negative growth rates for 
several years ip. this same period . 
• 
The new view represents the creation of open competitive markets with more distinct 
roles defined for the private sector and for government [Wolgin 1990 and World Bank 
1991]. The role of the private sector should be dominant in production and distribution in 
order to realize economic efficiencies and stimulate growth. The role of the state (often 
neglected in the 1970s and 1980s) is to ensure a correct environment for private sector 
business operation and prosperity. Many developing countries are conducting structural 
reform programs that transfer ownership of many previously nationalized assets back to the 
private sector. Laws and regulations are being changed to eliminate monopolies and 
encourage competitiveness. Farm land, import and export businesses, processing companies, 
banks, marketing services, and input services are being privatized (World Bank, IMF, and 
AI.D. structural adjustment loans are being used to facilitate the reforms). 
Demand and supply in a competitive market are being used to determine prices that 
guide the allocation of resources and the returns to the resources. Prices, interest rates, 
exchange rates, movement of goods, imports and exports are becoming free of government 
control. The private sector is investing in existing businesses and investing in new 
opportunities. 
In the new view governments realize their comparative advantage and their resource 
limitations. It is argued that governments need to focus on creating an economic and politi-
cal environment in which the private sector has a major role in the performance of the eco-
nomic activities of the country. The governments need to focus on creating the appropriate 
conditions for private firms to operate. In the case of input and output markets this means 
the government should promote competition in markets, emphasize the provision of facilita-
ting functions such as infrastructure, information, rules and regulations, contract enforce-
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ment, grades and standards, and research that have large public good components. This new 
view places the performance of most economic activity in the private sector. 
IV. Evaluation of Rural Financial Services 
A Importance of rural credit programs 
Credit programs and projects represent a major source of governmental support to 
agriculture in many developing countries. They have also been heavily supported by donor 
agencies. A huge amount of subsidies have gone to farmers and financial institutions 
through credit projects. 
The World Bank has been the largest provider of external funds for agricultural 
credit projects. A recent World Bank Review (1993d) concluded that of the 10 developing 
countries with the largest populations (excluding Europe), the Bank has played an important 
role in suppo~ng the dominant agricultural tending agency in every country except Nigeria. 
Altogether 94 countries received Bank funding for agricultural credit from FY1948 to 
FY1992. The amount approved in 683 projects totalled $16.5 billion measured in current 
dollars. This represented about 26 percent of the Bank's total agricultural lending during 
the period. About 40 percent of the funds were concentrated in just three countries (India, 
Mexico, and Brazil). Over 80 percent of the funds were allocated to projects in which credit 
was the chief disbursement, while the remainder went to projects with credit as a 
component. 
AI.D. has a long history of supporting agricultural credit. At the time of the AI.D. 
Spring Review of Small Farmer Credit in 1973, it was estimated that AI.D. had channeled 
more than $700 million into agricultural credit projects since 1950 (Donald 1976). An 
important characteristic of these projects was their small farmer orientation. Between 1973 
and 1985, AI.D. allocated an additional $300 million to agricultural credit making a total 
of slightly over $1.0 billion between 1950 and 1985. These estimates do not include the 
large amount of technical assistance provided in addition to the capital transfers (Chew 
1987). Adams (1990) estimated that for the Latin American region credit was involved in 
projects amounting to about $350 million in the 1942-70 period, and over $1.5 billion in the 
1973-90 period. It appears, therefore, that the lion's share of AI.D. credit funds went to this 
region. 
A significant portion of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) portfolio has 
also gone into agricultural credit projects. During the 1970-82 period, over $12 billion went 
into agricultural credit in over 60 loans. Additional projects included credit as a component 
(IDB 1984 ). The pipeline for 1983-86 included 13 loans in an amount of $640 million in 
addition to another 35 loans for $900 million in agricultural or rural development programs 
which usually contain sizable credit components. 
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The .Asian Development Bank (ADB) began its agricultural credit operations in 1970 
and by the end of August 1991 had approved 72 projects for a total of almost $1.4 billion. 
Just over $1.0 billion went to 36 agricultural credit projects providing credit to crop farmers 
and cooperatives for the acquisition of equipment. The remaining projects included agri-
cultural credit as a component in activities supponing the fisheries or livestock sectors. 
Over 60 percent of the credit projects went to 13 market economy countries in the region 
(ADB 1993). 
B. Common characteristics of credit projects and policies 
Donor support originally funded a combination of •credit-only- and •credit compo-
nent" projects. The credit component type was particularly important in early projects 
designed to stimulate farm production through the adoption of a package of production 
practices. ALD. projects in the mid 1950s, for example, first began with technical 
assistance. Credit was expected to play a secondary and supplemental role. Cooperatives 
were often promoted as the credit vehicle because of the influence of technical advisors 
drawn from t~~ U.S. Department of Agriculture and cooperative organiza.tions (Donald 1976 
and Adams 1990). With the advent of the Green Revolution, many projects specifically 
identified a package of inputs that fanners should use if they were to obtain credit. The 
credit was often supervised to assure that the recommended inputs were properly used. 
Later when the new inputs were assumed to be readily available and credit institutions were 
in place, credit-only projects were designed to stimulate lending to specific clientele groups, 
such as small farmers, who were frequently unable to borrow from lending agencies. In 
more recent years, some "institutional-strengthening" projects have been funded to 
strengthen financial institutions with on-lending being a secondary objective. 
The rationale for donor and government involvement in agricultural credit has often 
been based on perceptions of farmers' •needs: Ueberson, et al.(1985) summarized this 
rationale for early ALD. projects as follows: "One reason for the emphasis on credit was 
the assumption that access to credit was a critical constraint to the adoption of improved 
inputs and modern technologies. Modernizing agriculture requires large infusions of credit 
to finance the use of purchased inputs such as fertilizer, improved seeds, insecticides, 
additional labor, etc. Because savings in traditional agriculture tend to be relatively small 
at the initial stages of development, increased demand for working and fixed capital must 
largely come from an increased supply of credit. Small farmers have meager internal 
resources and, therefore, are most in need of production credit."' (p. 17). 
The perception of unmet credit needs led policymak:ers and donors to increase the 
supply of loans to "lead" agricultural development The following summary characterizes 
many of the features of government and donor funded agricultural credit programs in 
developing countries: 
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1) Attempts to increase the supply of funds available for lending to agriculture through: 
• portfolio quotas or targets for existing lenders, 
• the creation of specialized financial institutions to service agriculture, 
• the provision of grants and subsidies for non-financial institutions (ministries, 
departments, institutes, NGOs, PVOs), 
• central bank rediscount programs, often funded by donors, 
• mandatory placement of bank and/ or private sector deposits in specialized lending 
institutions, and 
• nationalization of banks that failed to make the desired amount of loans. 
2) Reduction in the interest rate on loans made to agriculture through: 
• interest rate ceilings on loans with the lowest rates set for the smallest/poorest 
borrowers, 
• low interest rates charged by the central bank on refinance funds, 
• encouraging banks to cross-subsidize by charging higher rates to non-priority 
borrowers in compensation for lower rates to priority borrowers, and 
• direct government interest subsidies to lenders. 
3) Attempts to reduce lending risks and costs through: 
• detailed targeting of loans including requirements about production practices and 
input use required of borrowers, 
• crop and loan guarantee programs, 
• creation of joint liability through lending to groups of borrowers, and 
• technical assistance to lenders to help improve institutional efficiency. 
Serious doubts about the design and impact of the traditional agricultural credit 
projects began to emerge as early as the 1973 AI.D. Spring Review (Donald 1976). Many 
subsequent evaluations and academic studies since then have documented the shortcomings 
of the "credit needs.. approach and have argued instead for a broader •rural financial 
markets .. 1 approach to the development of rural financial systems. The earliest studies 
tried to assess the impact of credit on the borrower's input use, production, and income. 
Impact analysis was fraught with difficulties, however, caused in large part by the fungtbility 
of credit (David and Meyer 1980). Furthermore, this analysis usually ignored the frequent 
negative impact of the credit project on the financial institution leading to the paradox of 
successful credit projects but failing financial markets (Adams 1988a). 
1 Dale Adams may be the first person to use this terminology in the Ohio State 
University Newsletter on Rural Financial Markets and Policy, No. 1, Oct.-Dec., 1974. 
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The next sections summarize the key findings of the studies and evaluations that have 
analyzed the impact of many traditional credit policies and projects on borrowers, lenders, 
and national economies. Although there is considerable consensus on the impact of credit 
in the literature listed in the references, there are exceptions. An important example is the 
World Bank Review (1993d) which reflects a continuation of the debate between World 
Bank agricultural projects and financial markets staff. Surprisingly, its recommendations are 
inconsistent with the World Bank's own 1993 Handbook on Financial Sector Operations. 
The conclusions and recommendations found in the recent literature of ALD., IDB, and 
ADB, however, are generally consistent with most academic studies. 
C. Impact of credit projects on farms 
The first place to look for credit impacts is on farms because many projects were 
specifically designed to influence farm operations. Clearly identifying and measuring these 
impacts is difficult even with new methodological tools. The basic problem is that the analy-
sis requires comparing what a farmer did when he received a loan with what he would have 
done without the loan. The latter alternative, of course, is not observable so the researcher 
is required to use some technique to approximate what cannot be directly measured. One 
frequently made simple assumption, clearly inappropriate, is that none of the actions under-
taken after receiving a loan would have occurred without it. This implies, for example, that 
a farmer would have adopted none of the new Green Revolution seed-fertilizer technology 
without receiving a loan. But since some farmers adopt new technology without receiving 
formal loans, obviously some formal loans simply substitute for own funds or informal loans. 
The "additionality" that can be attributed to formal lending, therefore, is less than the 
amount of total loans. Additionality is also reduced when borrowers ~ loan funds to 
more lucrative or desirable alternatives. The fungibility of credit makes it extremely difficult 
to clearly determine the true farm level impact. The problem is intensified when interest 
rates are highly subsidized on formal loans so it is more attractive for borrowers to borrow 
and substitute or divert the funds (David and Meyer 1980; Von Pischke and Adams 1980; 
Von Pischke 1983). This attribution problem must be recalled when evaluating the follow-
ing discussion about credit impact. 
A review of some of the early impact studies conducted by David and Meyer (1980) 
concluded that the impact of short-term credit programs on the new seed-fertilizer technolo-
gy was unclear. The technology was recognized as being highly divisible so farmers with 
varying financial constraints could adopt it but at different points along the modern tech-
nology function (i.e somewhere to the left of the profit maximizing point, Y, in Figure 1). 
On the other hand, medium and long-term credit might be more closely associated with 
changes in production because these loans may be used to finance the purchase of large, 
lumpy investments that are more difficult to self-finance. 
The 1993 World Bank Review tried to assess the farm impact of bank loans based 
largely on the experience reported in 41 credit projects completed in the last 5 years. The 
general impression reported for these projects is favorable, but this conclusion is based on 
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an admittedly weak economic analysis. Some cases seem clearer than others. The rapid 
expansion of shallow tubewells in northwest Bangladesh, for example, was associated with 
World Bank funding for the project. The rapid expansion of farm mechanization in central 
and southern Brazil in the 1970s and 1980s appears to be another example of farm level 
impact of a massive expansion of agricultural credit at heavily subsidized interest rates (also 
see Barros 1980). 
The experience of selected countries is revealing. The Philippines implemented the 
large Masagana 99 program with Al.D. support beginning in 1973 to expand rice production 
following disastrous typhoons and to bolster the country's land reform in rice growing areas. 
The program involved a package of inputs, supervised credit provided without collateral, and 
subsidized funds rediscounted to lenders by the central bank. The lending program reached 
as many as 530,000 farmers at one time, roughly one-third of all the rice farmers in the 
country, but the number fell to 70,000 by the early 1980s due to accumulated defaults. Rice 
self-sufficiency was attained for the first time during the first years of implementation. A.n 
evaluation coauthored by one of the government officials involved with the program (Sacay, 
Agabi.n and T~choco 1985) summarized the debates that exist about how much impact the 
program can claim on rice output which was already increasing due to farmer adoption of 
the new technology. The authors conclude that Masagana 99 should not have expanded as 
quickly as it did and the program could have employed much less credit thereby minimizing 
some of the adverse effects on the financial institutions described below. 
India is another country that has received large amounts of donor assistance to 
massively intervene in rural credit markets in pursuit of production, income and poverty 
alleviation objectives. A complex structure of institutions has emerged that is tightly admini-
stered with targets, quotas and interest rate controls (Reserve Bank of India 1989). About 
30 percent of the rural families have obtained access to institutional credit, but the system 
performs poorly in mobilizing deposits, efficiently lending, and recovering loans. Huge 
subsidies are required to prop up the system and the only way some financial institutions 
can survive is to cross-subsidize rural loans by charging nonpriority customers higher rates. 
Studies have been conducted to try to quantify the impact on agriculture in India of 
this massive credit intervention. Binswanger, Khandker and Rosenzweig (1989) analyzed 
how agroclimatic endowments and quality of infrastructure influenced the location of rural 
commercial bank branches. Then they analyzed the impacts of bank expansion and interest 
rates on agricultural performance. The rapid bank expansion was shown to have a large 
impact on fertilizer demand, and on investments in tractors, pumps, and milk and draft 
animals, but contributed to only a 3 percent increase in aggregate crop output over the 
1960/61 to 1981/82 period. Interest rates, however, were found to have little impact on 
fertilizer demand or aggregate output, but clearly reduced long-term investment. It was 
concluded, therefore, that the most important impact of agricultural credit policy was 
through the expansion of the commercial banking system rather that through interest sub-
sidies. In another study, Khandker and Binswanger (1989) included Cooperative Societies 
and Land Development Banks as well as commercial banks in an analysis to determine the 
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effect of expanded total formal credit supplies. This study also showed that formal credit 
played an important role in fertilizer and investment demand, but little direct effect on crop 
output. But formal credit was found to make a significant effect on the growth of the rural 
nonfarm sector. 
Another way to assess credit impact, especially in the countries where loan volumes 
reached large levels and were highly subsidized, is to study aggregate production trends after 
the credit supplies and/ or interest subsidies are reduced or eliminated. If an expansion in 
credit made a large impact on production. it is reasonable to expect that production should 
fall following a decline in credit. In practice it has been difficult to clearly identify any 
sharp short-term production declines due to credit shrinkage. (For example, see Vogel and 
Larson 1984 for Colombia, and Araujo, Shirota and Meyer 1990 for Brazil). This does not 
necessarily demonstrate a lack of impact, but it suggests that farmers have been able to find 
ways other than through subsidized formal credit to finance their operations when credit 
programs were changed or terminated. 
An iSSl.f<:; of potential concern is that the use of subsidized credit targeted to specific 
enterprises or capital inputs would lead to resource misallocation (Mellor 1966, p. 325). 
This could occur at the macroeconomic level if entrepreneurs were induced through cheap 
credit to invest in enterprises in a subsector that otherwise was uneconomic. It could occur 
at the microeconomic level if farmers were induced to utilize uneconomic combinations of 
capital and labor. This was a special concern when subsidized loans were targeted for 
specific capital inputs such as tractors and machinery. For example, Vogel (1984) noted that 
subsidized interest rates in Costa Rica could have influenced farmers to replace labor on 
dairy farms by acquiring electric milking machines. Adams and Gonzalez-Vega (1984) 
explored this concern and concluded that because of fungibility the firm level distortion 
question is not likely to be as serious in practice as suggested in theory. 
Some empirical studies have attempted to analyze the issue. The World Bank 
Review (1993d) tried to assess the possible resource allocation effects of credit projects it 
financed but the data available were weak. The Review noted that in the period 1978-85 
the rapid expansion in rural lending in Brazil was not matched by a commensurate increase 
in farm production. The problem was caused by substitution and diversion of formal loans 
by "urban cowboys" attracted to borrowing by loans inadequately indexed for inflation. 
When the interest index was raised to more fully reflect inflation, the credit program served 
"real" farmers whose apparent intention was to invest in farm enterprises. The evaluation 
did not discuss, however, if the additional investments, whether made in or outside 
agriculture, were directed towards otherwise unprofitable enterprises due to the cheap 
interest rates. A subsidized interest credit project in Yugoslavia was reported to have 
encouraged overinvestment in agroindustry resulting in substantial excess capacity. A 
moderately subsidized credit project in Pakistan was found to have not accelerated tractor 
use beyond their economic return, nor did it encourage excessive displacement of 
agricultural labor. On the other hand, reports covering credit projects in Morocco and 
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Tunisia suggested that oversized tractors may have been acquired by small farms because 
of subsidized loans. 
An analytical problem in clearly assessing resource allocation effects of cheap credit 
was noted in the Review. A credit project in Korea was credited with contributing to an 
overexpansion in the construction of greenhouses for horticultural production. It was 
argued, however, that the problem was not largely due to cheap credit, but rather to the 
country's tariff policy which protected producers from the competition of foreign suppliers. 
The effect of credit is difficult to disentangle from the effects of other policies. Most non· 
academic research does not use robust enough data or methodologies to separate these ef. 
fects and this problem is evident in much of the World Bank's effort to assess the farm level 
effects of its projects. 
A more robust analysis was conducted in a time·series study of district level data in 
tndia. Kbandker and Binswanger (1989) concluded that the additional capital investment 
that occurred because of increased formal credit contributed more to a substitution of 
capital for ag:rtculturallabor than for increasing crop output. They did not assess the impact 
of interest rate subsidies. However, because some of the job creation in the nonfarm sector 
was attributed to agricultural credit, there was a positive effect on agricultural wages which 
contributed to the reduction in farm labor use. 
More rigorous research is needed before concrete conclusions can be made about the 
effects of cheap credit on resource allocation. The limited analysis available suggests that 
the problem may not be as serious as some theorists expected, but highly subsidized loans 
targeted to specific capital investments may stimulate uneconomic investments and may alter 
farm level capital-labor ratios, especially in highly inflationary environments where 
machinery may be purchased as an inflation hedge. 
Another important concern about the cheap credit projects of the past was their 
impact on income distribution. Part of the rationale for subsidized credit targeted for small 
farmers has been to improve income distribution. Gonzalez-Vega ( 1984) developed his 
"Iron Law of Interest Rate Restrictions" to explain how interest rate ceilings on loans would 
likely lead to credit rationing by lenders so that the rich rather than the poor would receive 
most of the subsidized funds. The early empirical research on the income distribution 
effects of subsidized loans focused on Costa Rica and Brazil. The results for these two 
countries showed that the ownership of farmland was more concentrated than income, but 
the distribution of agricultural credit was even more concentrated than land ownership. 
Vogel (1984) estimated that the total value of subsidies received by borrowers of 
agricultural credit in Costa Rica in 1974 amounted to almost 20 percent of agricultural value 
added. The largest ten percent of bank agricultural loans accounting for 80 percent of the 
total loans made in 1974 went to large farmers so they received most of the interest subsidy. 
These large farmers already represented the wealthiest persons in the country so the interest 
subsidies aggravated rather than improved the income distribution problem. 
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The Brazilian experience is important to analyze because agricultural credit has been 
an important part of the country's agricultural development strategy. Formal agricultural 
loans expanded from less than 15 percent of agricultural GDP in the early 1960s to a high 
of 84 percent in 1975. Interest rates were usually less than they would have been if market-
determined, and usually negative in real terms. From 1970 to 1985, the annual interest rate 
subsidy generally varied from less than one percent of agricultural GDP to almost 20 
percent in 1979 and 1980. The 1970 and 1980 Census data revealed that relatively few small 
farmers reported receiving formal loans, so as in Costa Rica most of the interest subsidy 
went to the wealthiest farmers, thereby worsening the country's already highly unequal 
income distribution (Araujo, Shirota. and Meyer 1990). 
The World Bank Review (1993d) also addressed the distributional aspect of 
agricultural credit. It concluded that large farmers did not capture the benefits of its 
projects as much as predicted by the Costa Rican and Brazilian experiences for two reasons. 
First, the Bank projects by design often funded long-term investments of medium and large 
farmers compared to AI.D. projects which were more explicitly small farmer oriented. 
Secondly, in p_rpjects such as in Mexico where large farmers tried to present themselves as 
poor in order to get cheap credit, administrative procedures were tightened by the lenders 
to prevent major abuses. These Bank arguments are not very convincing, however, because 
little evidence is presented about the actual size distribution of borrowers. It is obvious that 
if some groups, such as small farmers or women. are targeted as priority borrowers for subsi-
dized loans, there will be powerful incentives for nonpriority groups to demand loans. When 
this demand is coupled with unscrupulous or overworked bank officials, some nonpriority 
borrowers will undoubtedly get loans. Furthermore, if the lenders perceive that the priority 
borrowers are risky, they have an incentive to tilt their portfolio towards less risky nonprior-
ity borrowers. 
The transaction costs of borrowing and lending have been analyzed to determine how 
they influence borrowing patterns. Since a large portion of a lender's cost in making and 
recovering a loan is fixed and does not vary substantially with loan size, the per unit cost of 
small loans is higher than large loans. Thus in the absence of interest rate controls, lenders 
who recover the full cost of lending need to charge higher interest rates for small loans. 
Donor supported programs, however, usually require that small borrowers be charged lower 
rates, resulting in various types of rationing by lenders to discourage small borrowers. Ra-
tioning often involves cumbersome procedures and multiple trips to the lender in order for 
the borrower to negotiate a loan. Empirical studies show that noninterest borrowing costs 
for small loans are often higher than interest charges (Meyer and Cuevas 1992). Survey 
data from eight countries revealed that borrowers of large loans paid transaction costs that 
varied from less than two percent of interest charges to almost 60 percent. Borrowers of 
small loans, however, paid transaction costs that varied from 13 to 245 percent of interest 
charges. This is one reason why small farmers choose to borrow from informal lenders with 
high interest rates but low transaction cost rather than seek formal loans (Ahmed 1989; 
Ladman 1984 ). Therefore, the distortions in loan allocation among small and large borrow-
ers have their origin in both the supply and demand sides of the loan market. Liberalizing 
19 
interest rates may improve loan alloca.tion although there are moral hazard and adverse 
selection problems2 because at very high rates only the riskiest borrowers may continue to 
demand loans or borrowers may engage in risky enterprises (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981). 
D. Impact of credit projects on lenders 
Whereas the impact of traditional credit projects on farmers is ambiguous and 
difficult to measure, the impact on many participating lenders bas become clearer and is the 
focus of much criticism. Many specialized agricultural development banks have failed in 
developing countries, and many institutions with large agricultural portfolios rely on subsidi-
es for their survival. Several studies have analyzed the reasons for this situation. Many of 
the problems are attributed to the negative effects of the traditional government and donor 
funded agricultural credit projects. 
One of the most important issues for lenders is the effect of credit projects on 
institutional viability. The record is quite negative. Several evaluation reports reveal poor 
performance of development finance institutions that have been used as important conduits 
for donor funtls (McKean 1990). Many agricultural development banks have faile~ others 
have had to be recapitalized because of losses, and most rely on continuous subsidies. 
Agricultural cooperatives and rural credit unions have a checkered record, and commercial 
banks frequently try to minimize their agricultural exposure. The World Bank Review 
(1993d) concluded that 77 percent of the institutions supported by bank agricultural projects 
had a good image, but only 44 percent had a good financial position by the end of the 
projects. In some cases, the institutions had been assisted by the Bank for several years. 
The crucial variables affecting the viability of most institutions are operating costs, 
loan recovery rates, and the rate of inflation relative to interest rates. The impact of 
seemingly small problems can be devastating for a financial institution's capital. Assume, 
for example, that an institution recovers 95 percent of the principal and interest due on 
loans, that operating costs are only five percent, and the nominal interest rate on loans is 
below the inflation rate by only five percentage points. If the institution lends out all of its 
money at the beginning of the year, the real value of its' funds at the ~nd of the year will 
be about 85 percent of the beginning of the year value. If all funds are lent out in all 
subsequent years, by the end of year five, the real value of the capital will be less that 50 
percent of the original value. 
Many institutions are not viable because they cannot cover loan defaults, operating 
costs, and inflation. Loan default is often the largest problem but data on default are scarce 
and unreliable. In the mid 1970s, AI.D. (Donald 1976) and the World Bank (1975) 
2 These problems refer to potential losses that lenders face due to the risk of choosing 
borrowers who are likely to default or who engage in actions after getting a loan that 
increase their probability of default. 
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struggled with incomplete and inconsistent data to present empirical information about the 
magnitude of the problem. In most programs studied, delinquency rates were high, 
frequently as much as 50 percent of amounts due. Some agencies were thought to have 
even higher rates that were concealed through the refinancing of unpaid debts. Many of the 
early studies of the causes of the problem focused on borrowers' inability to repay (Boakye-
Dankwa 1979). Later studies looked more carefully at how the design of the credit projects 
influenced loan recovery. 
The recent World Bank Review (1993d) found that out of 35 of its completed 
projects, 14 reported collection rates of 90 percent or more, five had rates between 50-70 
percent, and nine had rates below 50 percent. Furthermore, 13 reported declining collection 
trends, 19 reported level trends, and only three reported improving trends. The Review was 
quick to point out, however, that loan delinquency is not default. For example, although 
collection rates varied between 50-60 percent in India, estimates of default ranged from 5 
to 20 percent. The difficulty with the argument that delinquent borrowers eventually repay 
their loans, even if delinquency is high, is that a large amount of a lender's resources may 
be spent on loan recovery, and the relationship between delinquency and default may 
suddenly deteriorate. For example, the argument about eventual payment was made for 
several years in Bangladesh, but with the expansion of lending in the 1980s overdues 
reached huge levels. The farmers clamored for relief and the situation provided a tempting 
political opportunity which the government seized by using interest exemption and loan 
forgiveness programs to gain political advantages (Khalily and Meyer 1993). A complete 
breakdown in repayment discipline followed. 
The reasons for recovery problems are many. As the early studies noted, borrowers 
experience natural calamities that make it impossible for them to repay as planned. But the 
more systematic problem is found in the negative impact of government and donor funded 
projects on recovery. First, lenders tend to be rewarded for making, not recovering, loans. 
This leads to lax recordkeeping about repayment schedules and weak collection efforts. 
Second, subsidized interest rates lead to loan rationing which provides an environment 
conducive to political intrusion about who gets the cheap loans, and who must repay. Third, 
targeted loans carry restrictions about screening criteria for borrowers which may cause 
lenders to make loans to customers who do not meet their normal lending criteria. A 
quantitative estimate of this issue was conducted by Aguilera-Alfred and Gonzalez-Vega 
(1993 ). They found that loans made from funds provided by the government or donors to 
the Agricultural Development Bank of the Dominican Republic had a lower probability of 
repayment than those made from own funds following its own lending criteria. 
High operating costs damage the viability of lenders even if they recover most of 
their loans. The interest rate margins authorized in many credit projects are kept small in 
order to maintain low lending rates. But often the costs of reporting and documenting the 
use and impact of cheap funds provided by governments or donors is high. For example, 
the Agricultural Development Bank in Bangladesh developed a super form with over 150 
different rows to be completed by all branches for the required documentation of lending 
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by crop, loan type and donor program (Meyer 1988). Cuevas and Graham (1984) measured 
lending transaction costs for a government-owned and a privately-owned bank in Honduras 
and found they far exceeded the 3-4 percent authorized with donor funds. Lending costs 
using donor funds were nearly five times the cost of lending using own funds for the private 
bank. Ahmed and Adams (1988) found that the Agricultural Bank of Sudan was limited to 
charging 7-9 percent on loans when its administrative costs averaged 10-15 percent. Another 
reason that some specialized institutions can't cover costs is that they are restricted to 
making agricultural loans so they cannot cross-subsidize their operations by raising the rates 
for nonagricultural borrowers. 
A third reason for the lack of viability is that deposit mobilization has been 
neglected. Financial institutions that neglect savings mobilization are incomplete institutions 
and this affects their delinquency and default rates (Vogel 1984 ). When they deal with their 
borrowers also as savers, they obtain useful information to assist with loan screening. 
Furthermore, borrowers are more likely to pay and lenders are likely to exert more effort 
in recovery when the funds come from local savers rather than distant governments or 
donors. Sacay et al. (1985) noted that a "dole-out" mentality exists among borrowers in the 
Philippines which helps explain the low recovery rate in government sponsored lending 
programs. Savings mobilization can provide a more secure flow of funds to the lender than 
the frequent feast-famine syndrome associated with donor or government funds. This makes 
the lender a more secure source of funds for borrowers, and belief in the possibility of a 
future loan is a strong motivation to repay promptly. AlD. has supported several savings 
mobilization projects which have had a posrtive impact on loan recovery besides providing 
an important rural financial service. Important experimental projects involved credit unions 
and development banks in the Dominican Republic, Honduras, Peru and Bangladesh 
(Agency for International Development 1991). 
The World Bank Handbook on Financial Sector Operations (1993d) notes that a 
good prudential regulatory and supervisory framework is required to preserve the stability 
and institutional soundness of the entire banking system . Too often in the past, Central 
Banks were given the task of devising and monitoring compliance of policies designed to 
allocate resources to priority sectors or borrowers. They were distracted from their 
traditional role of maintaining a sound financial system and a stable currency. The lack of 
appropriate regulations and weak regulatory enforcement have contributed to the failure of 
some institutions. 
Finally, some projects have failed and participating financial institutions have 
collapsed because of a hostile economic environment (Chew 1987; Lieberson 1985; Meyer, 
Graham and Cuevas 1992; Simmons and Herlehy 1990). Some countries have experienced 
political disruptions, wars and civil conflicts that disrupted economic activities and created 
uncertainties that stymied investment and production. The general development strategy 
and accompanying macroeconomic policies pursued in several countries have been a major 
disincentive for agricultural growth (Krueger, Schiff and Valdes 1988). The terms of trade 
have turned against producers of major traded commodities in recent years. Some of the 
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new technology on which credit projects were predicated was neither as available nor as 
profitable as assumed. 
Financial institutions are affected in several ways when policies and market trends 
are negative for agriculture. First, fanners and agribusinesses are poor customers for loans. 
Therefore, lenders make few loans so their per unit operating costs are high. Second, some 
customers otherwise able to repay their loans are forced to default. Third, the financial 
institutions are discouraged from developing financial innovations to reduce the cost of 
serving a dispersed and expensive agricultural clientele. Fourth, the level of rural savings 
available for voluntary deposit mobilization is reduced. 
The lesson to be learned from the literature is that many credit projects have had a 
negative impact on financial institutions. In spite of large scale projects, many institutions 
supported by the Word Bank have made limited progress toward improved credit manage-
ment, especially the management of defaults, and the financial viability of many institutions 
is questionable (World Bank 1993d). The Review argues that the implications of these 
results are not clear, however, because subsidized systems exist elsewhere, including the 
Farmers Home Administration in the U.S. This argument raises two important questions. 
The first is whether or not financial institutions have reached a point where their future 
sustainability can be assured through government subsidies. The second is whether or not 
the subsidies spent on agricultural credit projects have earned a rate of return comparable 
to other investments. The answer increasingly appears to be "no" because the donors have 
shifted from large subsidized agricultural credit projects to supporting structural adjustment 
loans designed to correct policy distortions and small NGOs that are experimenting with 
alternative delivery systems emphasizing credit for microenterprises and women. The 
guidelines given for designing financial sector activities (see Chew 1987, lieberson 1985 and 
AlD. 1988 for AI.D., and the Handbook on Financial Sector Operations 1993c for the 
World Bank) emphasize that projects should not only provide credit needed for the real 
sectors of the economy, but simultaneously serve as a catalyst for development of the 
financial sector. 
E. Impact of credit projects on national economies 
There is very little evidence on which to assess the overall impact of credit projects 
on the national economies of the developing countries. The World Bank Review (1993d) 
recognized that agricultural credit projects have been a fairly easy mechanism for the Bank 
to disburse foreign exchange to borrower countries. Therefore, from the Bank's perspective 
it was important to discover that 96 percent of all Bank funds approved for on-lending in 
the 41 projects studied were actually disbursed. It might be argued that the positive impact 
on developing countries of receiving much needed foreign exchange might outweigh some 
of the negative sector-specific effects discussed above. This ignores the question, however, 
of whether or not the large investments and related subsidies for agricultural credit projects 
were the most profitable investments for these economies at the time they were undertaken. 
Both donor and government resources have an opportunity cost and the analysis available 
23 
suggests that the long-term benefits of these credit projects have been questionable. The 
abandonment by most donors of the traditional credit project suggests that a large amount 
of skepticism exists about whether or not their overall benefits exceed their costs. 
Only one detailed cost-benefit analysis has been located for a developing country of 
the type done in the U.S. (Hughes, Bednarz, Osborn, and Hall 1988). This study was 
conducted by Binswanger and Khandker (1992) using district level data for India for the 
period 1972/73 to 1980/81. The extra agricultural income attributed to agricultural credit 
was estimated to exceed government costs by only about 13 percent. Under less favorable 
assumptions, the benefits could even fall below the costs. Furthermore, the study did not 
try to assess the impact on future operations of the credit system that experienced steadily 
rising loan default. The difficulty with this study is that the positive impact of credit on 
production may have been masked by a decline in area cropped if, for example, some poor 
land went out of intensive cropping at the same time that credit facilitated more intensive 
cropping on the remaining land. 
A comprehensive cost benefit study of the macroeconomic effects of credit projects 
will always b'e' difficult to conduct because the fungibility of credit makes it difficult to 
quantify the real benefits of loans received by borrower households. Funds diverted from 
production to consumption expenditures, for example, may have a large, but difficult to 
measure, social benefit for poor households because of improvements in nutrition, education 
or health which may have a large economic payoff for society. On the other hand, credit 
projects that have led to political intrusion into financial institutions and the acceptance of 
high levels of loan default may represent a large social cost because of the negative long-
term effects of destroying the integrity of financial institutions and the sanctity of loan 
contracts. It would also be difficult to quantify the negative impact on the many households 
that are barred from borrowing today because of their failure to pay past loans that were 
granted as political favors. 
A study that needs to be done to clarify a controversy in Brazil concerns the impact 
on farm land prices of the large amount of subsidized credit received by large farmers. It 
bas been suggested that the diversion of large amounts of operating loans to finance 
speculative land purchases contributed to an increase in land prices above what could be 
justified by its present earning capacity. This could have exacerbated the already unequal 
distribution of land in the country. 
F. Analysis -of successful cases 
Although the results of many credit projects have been disappointing, there are a 
number of successful cases of financial activities in developing countries. It is instructive to 
note the nature of their accomplishments and identify the reasons for their success. 
Von Pischke and Rouse (1983) identified six cases of fairly successful financial 
services being provided to African smallholders up to 1980. They included the Caisse 
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Nationale de Credit Agricole in Morocco, the Cooperative Savings Scheme in Kenya, credit 
unions in Cameroon, savings clubs in Zimbabwe, group credit in Malawi, and rotating 
savings and credit associations in several countries. Some of the factors for their success 
were reported to be generally favorable economic conditions, emphasis on simple traditional 
rural institutions and savings mobilization, and a scale of operations consistent with the 
routine transactions of rural people. 
The Grameen Bank is world famous for successfully making thousands of small loans 
to poor people, mostly women, in Bangladesh (Hossain 1988). A less known story concerns 
several institutions in Indonesia that in total are serving even more poor people than tbe 
Grameen Bank. Chaves and Gonzalez-Vega (1993) argued that their success is due to both 
a hospitable environment for financial intermediation and effective organizational design 
reflecting an underlying concern for institutional viability. An important distinction betvteen 
the two country experiences is that loans are made to individuals in Indonesia while the 
Grameen Bank uses groups for most lending. 
The Indonesian experience in transforming failing financial institutions is also 
instructive. Patten and Rosengard (1991) analyzed the transformation of the Badan Kredit 
Kecamatan (BKK) and the unit desas (village units) of the Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI). 
The BKK program was set up in the early 1970s to provide loans from outside capital to 
rural people deemed too poor to save. By 1989 it had more than 500,000 loans outstanding, 
was covering all costs, including losses, and was financially viable. The unit desas were set 
up in the early 1970s to do in Indonesia what Masagana 99 intended to do in the Philippines 
to speed the adoption of Green Revolution technology. As occurred in the Philippines, the 
program experienced mounting arrears and operating deficits. The credit operations were 
redesigned in 1983-84. By mid 1990, the unit desas had more than 1.8 million loans 
outstanding, had more than 7 million savings accounts so savings exceeded loans, and tbe 
unit desas were consistently profitable. These tvto successes are attributed to a clear 
objective of creating viable institutions, and careful attention to institutional design, with 
constant monitoring of performance. 
Yaron (1992c) analyzed these two Indonesian institutions plus the Bank for 
Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC) in Thailand and the Grameen Bank 
because they are recognized as being four of the most successful financial institutions in 
developing countries. He calculated a Subsidy Dependence Index (SDI) to determine the 
increase in average on-lending rate required for the institution to maintain operations 
without any subsidy. The results based on the institutions' operations in the late 1980s 
showed that the unit desas had reached subsidy independence, the BKK and BAAC had a 
moderate SDI of 20-30 percent and were improving. The Grameen Bank was also 
improving but had a SDI of 130-180 percent. 
AI.D.'s savings mobilization projects in the 1980s in Honduras and the Dominican 
Republic were clear success stories in designing incentives to stimulate financial savings 
(Agency for International Development 1991). These experimental projects were imple-
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mented through an Ohio State University cooperative agreement. Prior to the projec+..s, 
credit unions and agricultural development banks were floundering in the two countries. 
They faced a shortage of funds, interest rates were not adjusted for inflation and loan 
delinquency and default rates were high. Through policy dialogue, the projects succeeded 
in changing attitudes towards interest rates resulting in positive rates of return for savers. 
Branches were opened in rural areas to reduce saver transaction costs. The dual stimulus 
of improved interest rates and reduced transaction costs prompted a large increase in 
deposits so the institutions were able to resume lending. Loan recovery improved because 
borrowers were willing to repay loans when they discovered that with improved liquidity the 
institutions were making new loans. 
Several East Asian countries are cited as cases where subsidized interest rates, 
directed credit and other financial market interventions were more successful in stimulating 
growth and modernization than has occurred in most other developing countries (Adams 
1987 and 1988b). A recent World Bank publication (1993b) provides explanations for this 
contrasting experience. Although the analysis does not specifically refer to agriculture, it 
provides important insights into the use of financial market interventions. The financial 
sector interventions were designed, first, to encourage financial savings and, second, to 
channel them into activities with high social returns. Compared to other countries, several 
East Asian countries achieved a better balance between the need to limit competition to 
assure bank solvency and maintain low banking spreads. Credit subsidies were limited in 
size, and stringent standards were applied to the selection and implementation of subsidized 
projects. Funds were usually used for the purpose intended and there were few loan losses. 
Where interventions did not work so successfully, as in Indonesia, the problems have been 
similar to other developing countries. "In contrast with Northeast Asia, credit allocation 
decisions in many developing countries were motivated by political and noneconomic consi-
derations. Projects were designed with conflicting objectives ..... the very large rents that 
could be obtained from subsidized credit were a strong incentive to corrupt practices 
..... projects were prone to poor appraisal and disbursements without proper documentation 
..... producing high loan losses and eventually large-scale failure of directed-credit programs." 
(p. 287) 
Informal finance is now recognized as having succeeded where formal finance has 
failed to successfully operate in hostile economic environments and provide useful services 
to rural people. Several cases have been presented which demonstrate the positive role 
played by informal finance, and why it is time to reassess the negative image often held by 
policymakers (Adams and Fitchett 1992). Informal financial arrangements can often solve 
problems too difficult for formal systems. For example, in the Philippines agrarian reform 
beneficiaries are able to informally pawn their cultivation rights in order to secure loans for 
off-farm investments and emergency expenditures (Nagarajan, David and Meyer 1992). The 
formal system cannot accept these rights as collateral for loans. 
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G. Important lessons learned 
The analysis of successes and failures presented above reveals a body of literatur~ 
that is generally supportive of the new view Qf rural financial markets and the recent policies 
that most donors have adopted for financial projects. The failures are dominated by top-
down projects designed to provide subsidized credit to targeted borrowers who are assumed 
to be too poor to save so savings mobilization is ignored. Often the projects intend to 
support food production., adoption of new technology, and reduction in rural poverty. 
Frequently, the objective is also to substitute for informal lenders who are believed to be 
exploitative. The projects are rationalized by the supposed positive impact on borrowers 
with relatively little concern for the impact on the participating financial institutions. 
The recent theoretical literature presents divergent views about the existence of 
market failure in financial markets, but the authors recognize that governments (and by 
implication donors) have limited abilities to improve the current situation (Besley 1992; 
Stiglitz 1992). The many failures experienced by governments and donors are supportive 
of this theoretical view. Studies show that the macroeconomic. financial. and agricultural 
policies of ma'rty countries must be refQrmed before interventiQns in rural financial markets 
are likely to be successful. Improved prudential regulatory and supervisory systems are 
required to insure the safety and soundness of financial institutions. Interest rates must be 
flexible so savers can be rewarded, and financial institutions can cover operating costs and 
default losses. Financial viability must be a central goal and incentives provided for actions 
that contribute to it. Monitoring systems must measure progress toward that goal, and signal 
when corrective action is required. Informal finance provides valuable services to rural farm 
and nonfarm enterprises. It may offer opportunities for linkage with the formal system to 
provide greater access to financial services for small farmers and the rural poor. Careful 
organizational design was needed in addition to a correct policy environment for the new 
financial institutions that have successfully emerged in recent years. More experimentation 
is needed with village banks, rotating savings and credit societies, and other user-owned 
institutions to design viable institutions and technologies for delivering financial services in 
the uncertain rural environments found in many developing countries. 
V. Evaluation of Agricultural Marketing Services 
A Importance of agricultural marketing services 
Agricultural marketing services tend to receive less project assistance from donor 
organizations than many other areas of project assistance. During 1980 to 1986 the major 
bilateral and multilateral technical and financial assistance agencies including ALD., EC, 
IDB, IFAD, OPEC, World Bank, and others made capital commitments to agriculture 
amounting to $ 12.5 billion with only eight percent of that amount allocated to agricultural 
marketing services [Meissner 1989]. Among the agencies the percentage allocated to 
"marketing only" projects ranged from 0 at IF AD to 16 percent for ALD. [Meissner 1989]. 
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About 12 percent of 203 AI.D. projects funded between 1958 and 1982 focused on 
assistance for "marketing only", although many other projects such as credit projects 
frequently have had a "marketing component" [Sole~ Wilcock, Lynch and Taylor 1985]. 
Inter-American Development Bank assistance for agricultural marketing services is also low 
[Meissner 1989J. World Bank project assistance in agricultural marketing is even more 
limited. A review of 402 agricultural projects from 1974 to 1985 discovered only 12 projects 
with a "marketing only" focus although 49 percent of the projects had some "marketing 
components" [World Bank 1990]. The amount of resources allocated to the marketing 
components was only three percent of total investment in the agro-industries portfolio, a 
small amount relative to the size of the projects. 
Geographically, the World Bank marketing assistance in 185 agricultural projects 
from 1974 to 1985 was distributed to Eastern Africa (51), Western Africa (59), East Asia 
(31), South Asia (4), Europe, Middle East, North Africa (10) and Latin America and 
Caribbean (30). A total of 203 ALD. agricultural service projects including credit, input 
and output marketing between 1958 and 1982 was distributed to Africa (72), Asia ( 40), Latin 
America (70), and Near East (21) [Solem, Wilcock, Lynch and Taylor 1985}. 
B. Appropriateness of marketing services assisted by donors 
Most project assistance for marketing services from donor organizations is focused 
appropriately on a few commodities particularly grain crop marketing, commercial crop 
marketing, livestock marketing, and, to a limited extent, fruit and vegetable marketing. 
World Bank marketing assistance in 185 agricultural production projects has been most 
consistently distributed to grain crops ( 67), commercial crops such as cotton, tobacco and 
tree crops (67), and livestock (51). Marketing assistance in livestock was more common in 
Latin America and Caribbean and East Africa, while commercial crop assistance was more 
important in East and South Asia. Grain crop marketing assistance was important in all 
regions. The distribution of AI.D. marketing assistance by commodities is about the same 
as the World Bank except that fruits and vegetables have probably received more assistance 
from ALD. than in World Bank projects [Schermerhorn 1986]. 
A review of the types of marketing service assistance included in the World Bank 
project components indicates a heavy emphasis upon "marketing hardware" such as market 
facilities, storage facilities, post-harvest facilities, agro-industry and processing, and roads and 
transport. Little emphasis was placed upon assistance for "marketing software" such as 
research, extension, price discovery, risk bearing, financing, market information, grades and 
standards, contracts, and increasing market competition [World Bank 1990, p. 27]. 
"Marketing software" assistance can be low cost yet very important. World Bank studies 
have found that small merchants and farmers can perform grain storage functions very 
efficiently; their investment cost for comparable facili~es is 50 to 100 percent of the 
government cost [World Bank 1990, p. 41]. Yet merchants generally have great difficulty 
obtaining bank credit to finance various activities including the construction of facilities and 
purchases of commodities. A recent study concludes that "trade finance mechanisms in 
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much of the developing world are rudimentary or nonexistent" [Wenner, Holtzman, and 
Ender 1993, p. 47]. 
Although the data are not available to the authors, A.l.D. appears to have more 
balance between assistance for "marketing hardware" and "marketing software" projects. 
In some countries donor coordination leads to agreements to specialize assistance in 
selected types of activities which may explain the way assistance is allocated among donors. 
The type of marketing service selected for project assistance needs to be appropriate 
for the recipient country. In some instances, the equipment is too capital intensive or too 
technologically advanced for the country such as high cost, specialized bulk grain handling 
and silo storage facilities when low cost flat warehouses and bag handling are more appro-
priate (World Bank 1990]. Grain storage projects in India, Bangladesh, Brazil and else-
where were justified on the grounds of significant losses in traditional storage (from 17 to 
21 percent). The projects' designers argued that bulk storage of grain in large facilities was 
more economical and would reduce significantly postharvest losses. Recent research has 
found that losses in traditional storage are much lower than previously thought ( 1.5 to 4.5 
percent) and ttlat bagged storage is more economical and flexible [World Bank 1990, p. 4]. 
The re-calculated economic rates of return (ERR) for the India and Bangladesh projects 
decreased from an original ERR of 25 percent to an ERR of 8.5 percent using the highest 
justified "without project" postharvest loss estimate of 5 percent. Adjusting for actual cost 
overruns reduces the ERR to 7.2 and moving to more realistic postharvest loss estimates 
would reduce the actual ERR to a very low level [World Bank 1990, p. -+1]. Given the low 
re-calculated ERR, it is very likely that the World Bank would not have considered there-
calculated ERR's as bankable projects. 
Large investments in wholesale markets and rural markets in Latin America, Asia 
and other areas were also justified on the basis of improving food marketing systems 
through reducing food losses and marketing margins by improving the performance of the 
food marketing system (World Bank 1990 and Harrison, Henley, Riley, and Shaffer 1974]. 
Many of these donor projects financed the construction of facilities that are owned and 
operated by the public sector. The calculated ERRs for some of these markets were most 
likely over-estimated for reasons similar to those for the grain storage facilities [W odd Bank 
1990]. 
The appropriateness of livestock project assistance in Africa has been especially 
troublesome because of a conflict between a nomadic type of production and the desire to 
modernize this production and to promote the use of more permanent pasture systems 
[Johnston, Hoben, Dijhkerman, and Jaeger 1987, p. 159]. A Kenya livestock development 
project found problems of animal health and disease control in the marketing of animals 
that needed to be herded long distances from the rangeland to the consumption points. A 
Tanzania livestock project lost an existing export market as a result of a political decision 
to nationalize export meat processing. The project found great difficulties entering new 
markets once the original market was lost [World Bank 1990, p. 58]. Bolivia and Brazil live-
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stock development projects found that the main negative factors were government controls 
on the price of beef, export restrictions, and marketing and processing problems [World 
Bank 1990]. 
W·orld Bank marketing assistance by type of institution indicates a very large share 
allocated to parastatals, small amounts to the private sector and to cooperatives, and none 
to non-government organizations. [World Bank 1990]. Although more balanced, AI.D. mar· 
keting assistance was also oriented mainly to the public sector (52%), mixed public/private 
sector (26%), and some private sector (22%) [Solem, Wilcock, Lynch and Taylor 1985]. The 
large share of donor assistance to the public sector has failed to produce the intended 
efficiency gains causing donors to re-evaluate their programs and to attempt to increase the 
share of assistance to the private sector. However, constraints imposed by donor require-
ments and by host government reimbursement guarantees, such as the exchange rate risk 
for hard currency loans and very restrictive AI.D. regulations, complicate direct assistance 
to private firms except for some technical assistance and "targeted on-lending" through 
agricultural banks. 
C. 'Timeliness and accessibility of markets 
Access to markets continues to be a serious problem for many farmers, especially 
small farmers, in most developing countries. It is argued that improving access to markets 
is an important way to increase the participation of farmers in the market economy and to 
improve their ability to sell their output and buy farm inputs and consumer goods at more 
favorable prices. Marketing service assistance from donor agencies has attempted to 
improve market exchange through projects designed to build rural roads, storage facilities, 
wholesale and retail markets, market information services, and cooperative marketing to 
correct the problem of market access. • 
Donor assistance, primarily to the public sector parastatals, has been successful in 
building a great deal of marketing "hardware" in many countries but the results have been 
disappointing because the facilities have frequently failed to improve market access for small 
farmers and the parastatals have not become financially self·sustaining. In many cases the 
facilities have deteriorated quickly because of poor maintenance. This has been a serious 
problem for public markets, and grain storage and handling facilities in Latin America and 
the Caribbean and Africa [World Bank 1990] Poor management of parastatals, wrong type 
of facility or wrong location of facilities, and high cost have added to these problems. 
Farmers complain about lack of access, slow service, payment delays, and low prices from 
many of these parastatal companies. For these reasons, many farmers prefer to use the 
private sector informal parallel markets. A World Bank evaluation of marketing projects 
with public sector and cooperative marketing components found the following problems in 
evaluation documents: 
• inefficient and inexperienced management; 
• inadequate record keeping and stock controls; 
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• late arrival of purchasing teams in the production area; 
• insufficient cash resources to purchase the product, and late and incorrect payments 
to producers for their products; 
• poor financial controls, inadequate accounting and auditing, and financial 
irregularities; 
• inadequate transport resources and logistic management; 
• over·staffing and high costs of operations; and 
• the unfavorable impact of government pricing policies on operating margins; and 
• the difficulty of providing adequate rewards and penalties to management for its 
performance [World Bank 1990, pp. 34-35]. 
The cotton parastatals in Francophone African countries appear to be an exception 
to the general problems of most parastatals. The "Compagnie Francaise pour le 
Developpement des Fibres Textiles)' (CFDT) has been the model developed in Senegal, 
Cameroon, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Ivory Coast. The CFDT model is a vertically integrated 
system that has a high degree of coordination among all the actors in the cotton production 
and marketing system. The approach combines development and extension of technology, 
input supply, 'rharketing, processing and financing. The CFDT model is credited for much 
of the success of the high input/high yield cotton production technology in Francophone 
countries compared to the low input/low yield technology of Anglophone countries [L.ele, 
Van de Walle, and Gbetibouo 1989.] 
AI.D. and other donors have assisted the development of market information 
services in many countries. Daily, weekly and monthly price information services for basic 
foods at the retail, wholesale and farm level and quantities marketed have been initiated 
and continue to operate in countries such as Brazil, Chad, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, 
Indonesia, Kenya, Korea, Mali, Philippines, Taiwan, Tunisia, and Thailand. Some of these 
services are being established through ALD. projects with Michigan State University and 
the Agricultural Marketing Improvement Strategies Project (AMIS). 
These services have helped to improve market arbitrage through better information 
about when and where to market products but there is room for improvement [Holtzman, 
Ouedragogo, Wittenberg, Menegay, and Aldridge 1993]. These authors conclude that some 
of the services need to improve the accuracy and timeliness of the information. Most of the 
services need a stronger orientation to the prospective users of the information such as 
private sector users and policymakers. Designing a workable system for these t\Vo different 
users is not easy. A very important, but missing component from most of the market infor-
mation services, is outlook information about anticipated supply and demand and current 
stocks that would sexve the private and public sector well as an early warning system for 
imports and/ or exports. 
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D. Profitability and return of market services 
Creation of profitable markets- where the participants have the incentive to invest, 
to assume risk and to expect a satisfactory return on that investment-- is probably the single 
most important consideration in project success or failure. Research bas found that 
producers are rational and will respond to economic incentives, and that producer prices in 
developing countries are typically below the prices in developed countries [Peterson 1988]. 
Based on the estimated long run supply elasticities (in the range of 0.90 to 1.19), higher 
prices will increase production substantially. Unfortunately, governments frequently 
intervene in markets with policies that depress producer prices and have a adverse effect 
on food production [Krueger, Schiff, and Valdes 1988]. 
Price level and price stability are central to the issues of incentives and profitability 
of markets. Governments may use a variety of policies to intervene in markets to affect 
prices in ways desired by policy makers. These policies include over or undervalued 
exchange rates, price ceilings, pan-territorial or uniform pricing, pan-seasonal pricing, 
marketing margin controls, high import and export taxes, parastatal marketing monopolies, 
and high sales 'taxes. These policies can reduce producer price levels dramatically to the 
point of eliminating incentives and profits to produce (Figure 1 illustrates the production 
impact of price reductions). For example, a large number of African and Central and South 
American countries (Ghana, Niger, Mozambique, Tanzania, Argentina, Brazil, Dominican 
Republic, Guyana, and Ecuador,) have used over-valued exchange rates in combination with 
other polices to depress producer prices in an attempt to control inflation and reduce food 
costs in urban areas [World Bank 1990, World Bank 1991, and Wolgin 1990]. As a result 
of lower producer prices and profitability, agricultural production and exports stagnated. 
In contrast, governments in some Asian countries such as Hong Kong, Korea., Malaysia, 
Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand have used a stable macro-economic environment with 
lower inflation, more appropriate exchange rates and more competitive markets to promote 
agricultural production and exports with more favorable prices [World Bank 1990 and 1991]. 
Price instability caused by thin or poorly performing markets, rainfall variability, or 
disease and pests can also reduce and/or eliminate the incentives to produce. Price 
instability is a problem for grains and other storable products as well as for the highly 
perishable products such as fruits and vegetables (Idris, Larson, and Baldwin 1990]. Price 
instability is most serious in these markets because small variations in supply can cause large 
price swings due to the inability of the market to absorb the increased production. Many 
projects attempting to diversify small farmer income through the introduction of new crops 
and livestock products have failed because of the lack of a stable market (domestic and 
export) for the new output. A World Bank review of export marketing of fresh produce 
from the Middle East to the EC found that projects need to pay close attention to the 
foreign and domestic market for farm products [World Bank 1990, p. 44] 
Governments frequently intervene in markets to stabilize prices through minimum 
price purchase and storage operations for grains. The costs of these purchase, storage and 
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sale operations have usually been very high ca.using large deficits that had to be paid by the 
government. Most of these operations have been conducted through government owned 
parastatal marketing boards. A review of the performance of these minimum price and 
storage operations in terms of the costs and benefits of stabilization indicates that the 
operations need to be dramatically downsized in most countries. Increased reliance upon 
trade to stabilize grain prices is more cost effective than government purchase and storage 
operations for many countries [Abbott 1985 and Neils, Reed and Lea 1992]. 
E. Issues of public or private sector delivery of services 
Until very recently, donors have preferred to work with public sector organizations 
for the delivery of marketing services in developing counties. The performance of these or-
ganizations has been very disappointing to the users, the government and the donors [World 
Bank 1990 and 1991]. Donors prefer and sometimes are constrained to work with govern-
ment organizations for a variety of reasons such as the belief that government could solve 
the problem, because of the convenience of working with existing organizations in most 
cases, and the security of government guarantees on loans. High costs, poor management, 
misuse of fwtds, political pressures to intervene, poor service and large operating deficits 
are some of the problems that have appeared in most of the projects assisting public sector 
organizations in marketing. Reducing government intervention in markets is viewed as 
necessary to improve market performance [Krueger 1978 and World Bank 1991]. 
Because of government failure, a shift in emphasis to deregulation of markets and 
promoting increased private sector participation has been occurring at a rapid rate in most 
developing countries since the mid-1980s (World Bank 1990 and 1991; Wolgin 1990, and 
Simons and Kent 1993]. Many countries are attempting to promote competition by opening 
up the economy to private firms, and by privatizing government parastatals and/ or the 
functions of existing marketing organizations. Important structural changes are taking place 
in the states of the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, Chile, Brazil, Mexico, Tanzania, 
Mozambique, Niger, Bangladesh and others [World Bank 1990 and 1991]. 
Wolgin (1990] analyzes the experience of AI.D. in agricultural market liberalization 
in Africa. He examines the Mali Cereals Marketing Restructuring Program, the Gambia 
Rice Market Privatization Program, the Madagascar Food for Progress Rice liberalization 
Program, the Zambia Multi-channel Agricultural Marketing Program. the Togo Cereals 
Export Liberalization Program, the Uganda Non~Traditional Export Promotion Program, 
the Mozambique Private Sector Rehabilitation Program, and the Niger Agricultural Sector 
Development Grant. His main conclusions are: 
• The biggest impact from market liberalization is the reduction in marketing costs that 
results in an increase in incomes of both producers and consumers; 
• In most liberalization experiences, real consumer prices have fallen; 
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• Most government monopolies were honored in the breach, and illegal parallel 
markets existed in most areas (Zambia is an exception) prior to liberalization. 
Nevertheless, the illegality of these markets substantially increased transaction costs 
and marketing margins; 
• Despite decades of suppression, despite poverty, despite sparse populations, despite 
war, there exists a broad trading community ready to enter into the input and 
commodity markets in most countries; and 
• Most liberalized markets are competitive, with marketing margins reflecting real costs 
of transportation and assembly; none of these cases demonstrate the existence of a 
rapacious, oiigopolistic private trading system [Wolgin 1990, p. 34]. 
Lele and Christiansen [1989] conclude that the experience with public sector 
intervention in agricultural marketing in the MADIA countries (Kenya, Malawi, Tanzania, 
Cameroon, Senegal, and Nigeria) indicates a clear need for institutional pluralism in 
fostering competition. The private sector can provide increased competition and can 
perform some' tasks more efficiently than parastatals, but if the private sector is to operate 
efficiently, the public sector must provide some basic services. These services include: 
• stimulating the development of an entrepreneurial class capable of undertaking risk; 
encouraging free entry into markets; 
• creating adequate infrastructure, transport, and communication networks for the 
efficient movement of goods, and; 
• promoting efficient financial markets that are able to support commodity markets. 
[Lele and Christiansen 1989]. 
A similar review of the components relating to marketing institutions in World Bank 
projects suggests several shortcomings: 
• inadequate marketing margins (due to price controls) were the primary cause of poor 
service from both public and private marketing channels; 
• problems of poor management in large parastatals and cooperatives seemed to 
outweigh the potential benefits of economies of scale; 
• cooperatives have often proved ineffective in marketing even though they had a more 
commercial orientation than parastatals; 
• where parastatals existed, private sector market channels continued to provide 
services and were often preferred by farmers; and 
• even successful parastatals tended to have difficulty maintaining good management 
and effective services [World Bank 1990, p. 3] 
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F. Analysis of successful cases 
Policy and regulatory reform of agricultural marketing services includes restructurino-
of the institutions providing the services, reform of agricultural exchange rates and pric~ 
policies, reducing or eliminating subsidies, reducing the role of public sector marketing, and 
encouraging private sector activity. Several of these policy reforms are being implemented 
successfully in the cases illustrated here and in other developing countries. Some examples 
follow: 
"In Tanzania, various marketing reforms have been implemented since 1984, 
including the reintroduction of cooperatives, the abolition of crop purchasing 
authorities ( 1984 ), a more tolerant attitude toward private traders (e.g. the 
elimination of restrictions on buying and transporting grains), a more clearly defined 
and restricted role for the grain-marketing parastatal (NMC), and legalization of 
private sector purchases from and sales to the NMC, cooperative unions, primary 
societies, and farmers. A preliminary assessment shows that all these steps have had 
a very positive effect-as could be ewected in a country that had been operating 
substa'ritially below its production possibility" (Lele and Christiansen 1989, p. 22]. 
"In Nigeria, marketing reforms have concentrated on privatization of export crop 
marketing, since food crop marketing is already largely in the hands of the private 
sector. Export crop marketing was a government monopoly until the end of 1986, 
when the relevant commodity boards were abolished as part of the structural adjust-
ment program. Subseqyent privatization of export crop trading. combined with 
currency de-valuation in October 1986. led to substantially higher producer prices for 
these crops. However, privatization also led to problems of quality control, as a 
result of which Nigerian cocoa now sells at a discount" [Lele and Christiansen 1989, 
p. 23]. 
"Ghana is expanding the fresh export market just as that market is growing rapidly. 
The prospects are good. The European market is relatively close and the land 
resources good. What is lacking is the structuring of a complete vertically 
coordinated system. That would involve coordinated planting and cultivation for 
quality and timing control, the development of secondary (processing and local) 
markets and appropriate handling systems. In short a duplication of the U.S. 
vegetable processing system is needed. Preceding all of this, a careful marketing study 
in Europe is required. Structuring such a system in Ghana using market incentives 
contracts, etc.) will be a lengthy process" [Lesser 1992, p 3-6]. 
"Ecuador has successfully pursued policy and regulatory reform of agricultural mar-
keting services in the 1980s to deal with a stagnating economy and agricultural export 
sector. The exchange rate reform of the 1980s illustrates a change from an inward-
oriented development policy based on import substitution to an export oriented and 
market oriented development policy. In May of 1982, free market rates for the 
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"sucre" were more than 50 percent above official and intervention rates. Policy-
makers embarked on exchange rate reform that included a 33 percent de-valuation 
of the "sucre" in rnid-182 mini-devaluations from 1982 to 1984, another major 
devaluation in 1985 and a shift to floating rates in 1986, a return to fixed rates in 
1988 and a managed float after August, 1988" (Bejarano, Lee and Greene 1993 p 2]. 
Marketing reforms have focused on the three parastatal monopolies and 25 mixed 
government/private marketing companies in Ecuador. ENAC is a price stabilization body 
for major grains and cotton, EMPROVIT is a state enterprise that sells basic foods at 
official prices to consumers. E.N. SEMillAS is the national seed company. Like most 
parastatals, these have many problems of high cost, poor service, operating deficits etc. The 
government of Ecuador in the last few years has reduced the role of these parastatals by 
privatizing many of their functions and attempting to sell off the facilities. Agricultural 
production. exports. and marketing of the private sector have responded positively to the 
policv and structural changes [Abbott 1985]. 
"A loud and clear message in the marketing and policy literature of the past five 
years is· that donor agencies must understand the medium to long-term nature of 
institutional reform. The Cereals Sector Reform Program (PRMC) in Mali illustrates 
the benefits of staying the course; donors have collaborated for a decade in restruc-
turing the cereals board OP Al\1, changing it from a statutory monopsony to a food 
security agency which maintains a strategic reserve and provides market information 
services to both the public and private sectors, financing empirical studies to monitor 
the impacts of cereal market liberalization and inform policy formulation, and provid-
ing financial assistance to the emerging wholesale trade in cereals through implemen-
tation of a targeted credit program. by 1988-89 OP AM was out of the business of 
trying to support a producers floor price, which had been set too high ... A vibrant 
private grain trade has emerged, which has exported modest quantities in surplus 
years .... Studies of grain producers and marketing agents provided a strong empirical 
base on which to design a Market Information System (MIS) in OP AM by 1988-89, 
which has been widely regarded as the most successful MIS design and implementa-
tion efforts funded by AI.D. in Africa. The long term payoff from patient. analyti-
cally driven cereals policy and institutional reform needs to be heeded." [Holtzman 
et al. 1992, p. 18]. 
An assessment of grain storage in Ukraine and Russia was completed to improve the 
storage of grains in the New Independent States (N1S), giving emphasis to the emerging 
private sector and the need for low cost storage in the agricultural producing regions. 
Borsdorf et. al. [1992] found that, as in many other countries, the reported post-harvest 
losses of up to 40 percent were impossible to document. Physical losses are considered to 
be much lower; however, improvements in grain storage, drying, handling and conditioning 
are needed but the institutional barriers are large (Borsdorf et. al. 1992]. The study also 
found that individual private farmers have no storage facilities and must either sell grain at 
harvest or rent storage in the state elevator system or at state/collective farms. The public 
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sector has sufficient capacity under its control, but the capacity is sub-standard. In Russia 
one of the most significant factors affecting grain storage is the conflict bet\lleen the state 
and the farmers concerning the price the state is willing to pay farmers for wheat required 
to be delive~ed under state order. The study concludes that the state monopoly on storage 
and purchasmg must be broken if privatization and competitive markets are to succeed. 
The success of nontraditional exports from some countries is an excellent example 
of what can be done through changing the marketing system. Nontraditional exports or high 
value foods (HVF) usually include products such as fresh and processed fruits and vege-
tables, meats, fish, dairy products and vegetable oils. Changing consumer demand in the 
importing countries has been the engine driving the growth of these developing country 
exports. During the 1980s, the value of traditional exports such as cereals, sugar, and 
tropical beverage crops actually declined while the value of trade in HVF increased 4 
percent annually for items such as fresh vegetables and fresh meat to over 11 percent 
annually for dairy products and shell fish. Exports of HVF by middle and low income 
countries totaled $52.5 billion in 1990 compared to traditional exports of only $26.3 billion 
for coffee, cocoa, tea, sugar, cotton, and tobacco [Jaffee 1993]. 
There have been some failures in export promotion but also some notable successes. 
The successes are examined in a World Bank study of 15 commodity system success stories 
from 9 countries [Jaffee 1993]. The 15 cases are: (1) Mexican fresh tomatoes, (2) Kenyan 
specialty and 'off-season' vegetables, (3) Israeli fresh citrus, ( 4 to 6) Chilean temperate fruit, 
processed tomatoes, and fish products, (7-8) Brazilian frozen concentrated orange juice and 
soybean products, (9-10) Argentine beef and soybean products, (11-13) Thai poultry, tuna, 
and shrimp, (14) Chinese shrimp, and (15) Taiwanese high-value processed foods. 
These successes exhibit several lessons valuable for donor agricultural marketing 
technical assistance projects. Each commodity system faced very favorable international 
market conditions during the 'take-off stage and for many subsequent years. Most of the 
commodity systems faced favorable macroeconomic policies at the time of their initial "take-
off." Several common ingredients needed for the competitive response to a favorable mar-
ket were: (a) favorable natural endowments, (b) strong human capital, (c) well-developed 
physical infrastructure, and (d) the capacity to effectively develop and/or adapt imported 
production and processing technology. Another common factor was the prior or parallel 
development of complementary industries which lowered input or investment costs or 
created additional demand. In nearly all cases, the private sector has played a dominant, 
if not exclusive role in commercial production, processing, and trading activities. In the vast 
majority of cases, governments have provided facilities and services which have either public 
good properties, give rise to externalities, or exhibit large economies of scale. Developing 
countries can compete against industrialized country suppliers in markets for a wide range 
of high value products. Export diversification often depends upon prior or parallel domestic 
market development. The study concluded that government interventions should be general-
ly geared toward encouraging competitive and flexible export marketing structures and not 
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provide favorable treatment to some (e.g. monopolies) and exclude others (Jaffee 1993, pp 
57-60]. 
VI. Evaluation of Agricultural Input Marketing Services 
A Importance of agricultural input marketing services 
Another report of this "investments in agriculture" review will focus specifically on 
issues of agricultural technology development and diffusion. For the purposes of the present 
report, agricultural input marketing services includes the marketing systems or delivery 
systems that are needed for biological, chemical and mechanical technologies. Farmers 
require efficient input marketing services that can deliver the right product, at the right 
time, in the right amounts, at a convenient place, and for a reasonable price. 
The impact of price policies and input marketing services on the diffusion of 
improved technology should not be underestimated. In a study of agricultural technology 
in Sub-Sahaia'n Africa, Oemke and Crawford (1993, p. 10) found that ... "input supplies 
including seed and credit) and output markets play key roles in supporting or restraining 
adoption of productivity increasing agricultural technology. Lack of effective, improved seed 
multiplication and distribution was a critical constraint in Uganda and Niger, as was lack of 
fertilizer in Zambia. In contrast, wide use of improved maize hybrids in Zambia was 
encouraged by relatively effective input and output markets." 
Agricultural inputs and the associated marketing services have received a great deal 
of attention from developing countries and donor organizations in an effort to improve land 
and labor productivity and incomes in rural areas. Frequently, the agricultural input 
marketing services have been developed to deliver a package of inputs that farmers buy to 
obtain the expected gains in productivity. Credit to finance farmer purchases was often an 
essential part of this input package. Many credit projects discussed above had major 
agricultural input marketing components. 
In most donor projects the biological technology has focused on efforts to improve 
crop productivity (especially better seeds) more often than livestock productivity; the 
chemical technology has focused efforts largely on fertilizer projects; and mechanical 
technologies focused efforts on small scale mechanization. Animal traction has not received 
much donor attention and is not included in the present report. 
The main institutional models employed for input marketing services include private 
retailers, agricultural banks, cooperatives, government institutions such as parastatals, and 
non-government organizations (NGOs). A World Bank survey of input marketing in the 
1980s in 39 countries examined the frequency of government and private sector control (con-
trol was defined as 80 percent or more of the activity) and showed the very strong tendency 
for government control of procurement and distribution [World Bank in Abbott 1993]. The 
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countries reported 64 percent government control for fertilizer supply, 61 percent control 
for seed supply, 47 percent for chemical supply and 42 percent for farm equipment supply. 
Private sector control was only 11 percent, 11 percent, 17 percent and 22 percent, 
respectively. The remainder was mixed government and private sector involvement. 
B. Appropriateness of agricultural input marketing services 
The appropriateness of agricultural input marketing services is best illustrated in crop 
technology development and distribution. Widespread gains in food crop productivity have 
occurred from the improved rice varieties, especially irrigated rice, wheat and maize 
varieties in many countries of Africa., Asia and South America. Widespread productivity 
gains comparable to these three examples have not been achieved for other crop products 
or for livestock products. 
A major difficulty with developing the appropriate of technology is the weak research 
base in most developing countries. Very few countries have the human resources and 
institutional ~e.sources to conduct scholarly research for an extended period of time to 
discover the technologies that work. Developing countries have had to depend upon 
technology developed by the international research centers (CIAT, IRRI, ICRISAT, 
CIMMYT etc.) for local application or on technology developed for more advanced 
countries that can be adapted to local conditions [Oemke and Crawford 1993]. 
Of the chemical technologies, fertilizer manufacture, import and distribution have 
been common to a large number of donor projects. They often have involved the use of 
parastatals. The fertilizer technology has proved to be appropriate at the farm level when 
other components of the input package were also appropriate such as for irrigated rice and 
high value export crops. Fertilizer applied to traditional crops has generally not been 
profitable in spite of many project efforts and huge government price subsidies to encourage 
fertilizer applications [Lele, Christiansen and Kadiresan 1989]. 
A.I.D. has supported a number of fertilizer market liberalization programs in Asia, 
Africa, and Central and South America designed to reduce government fertilizer subsidies, 
reduce or eliminate fertilizer price and marketing margin controls, reduce government 
parastatal distribution of fertilizer and increase private sector marketing of fertilizer and 
other inputs. Wolgin (1990) recently examined the Malawi Fertilizer Subsidy Removal 
Program, the Kenya Fertilizer Marketing Development Program, the Cameroon Fertilizer 
Sub-Sector Reform Program, and the Guinea Economic Policy Reform Program. From this 
examination he concludes that: 
• Private marketing is substantially more efficient than public sector marketing, and 
the efficiency gains of privatization can amount to 25 % of the total cost; 
• The available evidence suggests that private markets are competitive and efficient; 
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• Privatization is extremely complicated and difficult; and 
• Not all donors have bought into the A.I.D. view of [reducing] fertilizer subsidies and 
marketing, and some donor programs actually work at cross purposes to what A.I.D. 
has been trying to achieve. This makes the task of donor coordination much more 
important and more difficult [Wolgin 1990, p. 37] 
Mechanical technology has generally not been the focus of donor projects in 
developing countries. The large scale of developed country machinery has prohibited the 
widespread transfer of this technology to the developing world. Small tractors, sprayers, 
pumps, plows, carts etc. have been found to be appropriate in a number of country projects 
such as Bangladesh, India, Thailand, Korea, and Mali. 
C. Timeliness of delivery of agricultural input marketing services 
If appropriate technology is developed and available within the country, the technolo-
gy may fail que to the lack of timely delivery to the fanner. In modern, input intensive, 
biological production processes, timely availability of inputs is essential. In traditional, sub-
sistence agriculture, timeliness of input delivery is not important because few inputs are pur-
chased off the farm. As farms modernize and adopt the technology packages, they become 
very dependent upon timely input delivery services. A large number of factors can affect 
the timeliness of deliveries. Credit is important to finance the purchase of these input 
packages for farmers and for merchants. The inefficiencies of the banking system can cause 
credit delays so the farmer cannot buy the input when needed. Merchants can and do 
finance some fertilizer sales to farmers, but their ability to obtain bank financing greatly 
reduces the amount of informal finance. Bad weather, poor roads and ineffective transpor-
tation systems can delay the delivery of inputs. Inefficiencies of government owned para-
statals that have monopoly control of the distribution of inputs and shortages of foreign 
exchange cause delays or shortages of inputs. 
A study of fertilizer policy in Africa identified the following supply constraints asso-
ciated with the timely delivery of fertilizers: macroeconomic factors such as shortages of 
foreign exchange to import fertilizer, budgetary problems of parastatals to finance imports 
and distribution, import licensing systems, lack of working capital for importers, wholesalers, 
transporters, and retailers, price controls and fixed marketing margins, poor transport 
facilities, remote production areas, and a weak cooperative sector [Lele, Christiansen, and 
Kadiresan 1989, p.47]. 
D. Profitability of agricultural input marketing services 
The importance of profitability of input use should not be underestimated. The 
market system depends upon returns (profitability) to determine the allocation of resources. 
For example, a farm level benefit cost ratio of two or more is considered necessary for the 
widespread adoption of fertilizer. The profitability must be at least that high to assume the 
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increased risk associated with fertilizer use (Lele, Christiansen and Kadiresan 1989]. This 
profitability level has been obtained for the Green Revolution varieties but not for many 
traditional crops. The profitability of using improved varieties or hybrid seeds is a similar 
problem for input m~keting. "It has been demonstrated many times during the past 25 
years that truly supenor seeds will almost 'sell' themselves. Marketing difficulties, however, 
are encountered wj:len the seed represents a solid, demonstrable, but only modest improve-
ment over the seed presently planted by cultivators (e.g. yield advantage of less than 20% )" 
[Pray and Ramaswami in Abbott 1993, p. 312. ]. Although no empirical estimates are availa-
ble, demand is likely to be very inelastic for the truly superior seed and very elastic for the 
not superior seed. Because of the large potential demand for increased use at a lower price 
governments frequently sell inputs at low and controlled prices or choose to subsidize the 
sale of these inputs. Both approaches have many implications for market intervention, 
government costs, input costs and equity to users, and private sector participation. 
Government intervention in markets through over-valued exchange rates, subsidies, 
interest rate, and output and input price controls frequently influence adversely the 
profitability of input use in agriculture. This intervention and reduced profitability was 
considered to' be a major problem in the El Salvador agricultural inputs industry [Hugo, 
Worman, and Ramos 1992]. If the appropriate technology exists and the input marketing 
system is effective, input use may fail because of government policies that eliminate the 
profitability of use. Government desires for cheap food for urban consumers and the widely 
held view that profits are ''bad" are used to justify intervention in markets to reduce 
producer prices for output [Jebuni and Seini 1992]. Policy makers may choose to subsidize 
input use or attempt to control input prices at low levels as a way to compensate producers 
for these reduced output prices. 
E. Analysis of successful cases 
Bangladesh illustrates successful structural and policy reform in input markets. 
Government of Bangladesh (GOB) policy has emphasized growth of competitive markets 
and increased private sector participation in marketing and distribution of fertilizer, irriga-
tion equipment, fuel, improved seeds and pesticides since 1978 [Larson 1992]. One result 
of this policy has been that Bangladesh has changed completely the fertilizer marketing 
system by eliminating the government owned parastatal monopoly control of pricing and 
distribution. Until 1978, the Bangladesh Agricultural Development Corporation (BADC) 
controlled all aspects of the importation of fertilizers, purchase of fertilizers locally from the 
domestic manufacturer Bangladesh Chemical Industries Corporation (BCIC), transportatio~ 
storage, financing, wholesale and retail sales and pricing. Many problems of pricing, sub-
sidies, financing, inefficiencies of distribution and warehousing, high costs, shortages of 
supplies, and complaints of poor service emerged during the BADC era [IFDC 1990 and 
1991]. 
With A.I.D. assistance in 1978, the International Fertilizer Development Center 
(IFDC) on contract through the Fertilizer Distribution Improvement Project (FDIP-I) began 
41 
work with the GOB to reform the fertilizer sector and to increase private sector 
participation in the fertilizer market. Major accomplishments as of mid-1980 include the 
following: 
• BADC's fertilizer points of sale will be reduced by 55-60%; about one-third of the 
original 130 thana warehouses have been closed. 
• In the Chittagong Division, farmer access to fertilizer poiri.ts of sale has greatly 
increased. 
• Prices paid by farmers for fertilizer under the NMS (New Marketing System) are 
lower than under OMS (Old Marketing System). 
• A new class of private wholesalers developed as intermediaries. 
• Despite the change in the system and a local drought, fertilizer sales in the 
Chittagong Division, as a percentage of national sales remained unchanged. [World 
Bank in Abbott 1993, p. 303]. 
More change has occurred since the mid-1980s. Private sector market share in total 
national sales of all fertilizers increased to over 84 percent in 1990-91 from 61 percent in 
1989~90 and trdm nearly zero when the program began [IFDC 1990 and 1991]. Private firms 
now handle all urea marketing and since March of 1989 have been allowed to buy urea 
directly from factories for the same price as BADC. At the same time, private firms were 
allowed to take delivery of imported fertilizer directly from ships at the ports. In a major 
policy refonn, the GOB allowed private sector imports of fertilizer (previously BADC 
controlled all imports) for the first time in June of 1991. i' 
Fertilizer retail and wholesale price controls have been eliminated, but the GOB 
retains control of the domestic price of imported materials that are currently subsidized by 
setting the domestic price about 23 percent below the cif cost or import parity price. 'This 
subsidy applies to triple super phosphate and muriate of potash which are the main 
imported materials. 
Private sector merchants of irrigation and agricultural equipment have become 
increasingly important in the economy since the GOB reforms to encourage privatization 
in 1978. BADC which used to be the sole collector and distributor of all domestic and 
foreign fertilizers, pesticides, irrigation and agricultural equipment has given up control of 
these agricultural inputs to the private sector. Private sector shares have increased from less 
than 10 percent of sales to about 90 percent while the government owned BADC share has 
decreased from over 90 percent to about 10 percent of irrigation and agricultural equipment 
sales in the 1980s. Since the elimination of BADC standardization of imported equipment, 
farmers may choose from a wide range of engine types and sizes (Larson 1992]. 
Ghana is an example of structural reform in progress with some positive benefits 
already observed. In Ghana, modern agricultural inputs (fertilizer, agrochemicals, seeds and 
machinery have been heavily subsidized to increase agricultural productivity and production 
and to compensate for low producer prices [Jebuni and Seini 1992]. Parastatal companies 
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were organized to monopolize the importing, distribution, and sale of the subsidized modem 
inputs. In 198~, the government of Ghana initiated the Economic Recovery Program to 
restore econonuc growth. The program included macroeconomic stabilization and structural 
adjustment. The key policy changes included several devaluations of the exchange rate to 
more realistic levels, price and income policy to restore producer price incentives, tight fiscal 
and monetary policy, removal of subsidies on modem agricultural inputs, and privatization 
of the import, distribution and sale of inputs. 
A~ochemicals are now largely handled by the private sector. Subsidies have been 
eliminated and prices have been uncontrolled for some time. Several major companies 
import and distribute chemicals; however, availability is restricted to dealers in large towns 
because effective demand is small. The Ghana Seed Company, a candidate for privatization, 
has not operated since 1989 creating a vacuum in the seed industry. Reliance has been 
placed on the Grains Development Board, and a few selected private seed growers to fill 
the void. A national seed service has been established to supervise the seed industry. 
Private seed growers have been registered in all major ecological zones and will be assisted 
to produce and market certified seeds to farmers throughout the country. The Ministry of 
Agriculture machinery services to farmers have been eliminated. The tractors and combines 
have been sold to private farmers. Nominal charges for tractor services have increased 
because of the elimination of subsidies. In real terms farmers have benefitted because they 
now pay 70 percent less for plowing than in 1980 and 30 percent less for carting [Jebuni and 
Seini 1992]. 
Cameroon has initiated a Fertilizer Subsector Reform Program (FSSRP) with 
assistance from AI.D. designed for implementation from 1988 to 1992 [Blaine et. al. 1991]. 
The FSSRP emphasizes economic liberalization and privatization of the fertilizer sector. 
This includes elimination of the parastatal monopoly of the imports and distribution of 
fertilizer, phasing out of a fertilizer subsidy, and establishment of a free market system by 
the end of the program. 
Importing and distributing of fertilizer is being liberalized as Cameroon moves 
toward privatization of this industry. However, the state is still phasing out a fertilizer 
subsidy and needs to phase out preferential interest rates for fertilizer importers and 
distributors. Fertilizer sales have remained about the same since liberalization. 
Liberalization has been beneficial and positive bv stopping the waste. corruption. and 
inefficiencies of the parastatal company and by reducim~ the Government's subsidy bill by 
about US$ 14 million in only two years. Farmers have been protected from large price 
increases as the subsidies are being withdrawn by the efficiencv gains from the private sector 
imports and distribution. 
FSSRP sustainability will depend upon how the government proceeds on 
comprehensive structural reform program (exchange rates, fiscal deficits, banking reform 
etc.) as well as emergence from the current economic crisis. The FSSRP has found that, 
like many other projects, policy reform is a process that requires dialogue. flexibilitv. 
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expertise. networking. patience. and management intensity. Market reforms may lead to the 
failure of some firms: however. the benefits wiii be ~Ueater efficiency and economies of 
scale. Reforms must be carried out in comprehensive orderly manner. Reform of the input 
side of a productive sector such as fertilizer will probably be difficult to complete without 
reform of the output marketing sector such as coffee and cotton [Blaine et. al. 1991]. 
In biological technology transfer, the Zimbabwe hybrid seed program has achieved 
success with over 90 percent maize hybrid adoption by producers, and notably higher yields 
than for neighboring countries. The success of hybrids is attributed to breeding as well as 
good government support services - input delivery, credit access, favorable prices and 
extension [Lesser 1992]. Commerce is heavily regulated, but the restrictions are being 
removed. The government regulates the entire marketing system including prices, 
movement, and storage for maize, wheat, and white sorghum. Inputs are coordinated 
through farmers' organizations such as Seed-Coop, the association of commercial scale 
fanners or by supplier groups such as Agricultural Chemical Association. The Seed-Coop 
bas its own breeding program and exclusive rights to hybrids developed by the government's 
Department of research and Specialist Services (DR&SS). New competition includes 
CIMMIT (!985), Pioneer Overseas Corporation (1988), Cargill Zimbabwe (1991) and 
Dekalb Hybrids (1991-93 joint with Seed Coop). Seed-Coop has a monopoly on seed 
production but private firms compete )trongly on qualitt control. better service and 
improved distribution. 
Seed trials are delayed because of the public sector's inability to keep up with the 
amount of advanced trials for their varieties due to budgetary problems. A privately funded 
independent Agricultural Research Trust is becoming increasingly important for the conduc-
ting the trials for the seed houses. The existence of plant breeders rights was not important 
in the decision of private international firms to locate in Zimbabwe because hybrid maize 
does not require legal protection except for the inbred lines. This may become more impor-
tant in the furore with wheat, barley, and millet. Seed price controls have become a thorny 
issue as high inflation has reduced the real price of seed from 1987 to 1989. Declining 
profits for seed companies and farmers are a problem [Lesser 1992, pp 2-15 and 2-16]. 
F. Important lessons learned 
The discussion of the cases above illustrates that many lessons have been learned 
from donor assistance for agricultural output and input marketing service projects. The 
following identifies some of these important lessons. 
Political stability and correct economic and financial policies create the economic 
environment in which the economy can perform best. Entrepreneurs will not be willing to 
invest and take risk with the expectation of earning profits without the correct macro-
environment [World Bank 1990 and 1991; Wolgin 1990; and Jaffe 1993]. 
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Policy reform and institutional change is a process that takes dialogue, time, and 
flexibility. Donor projects need to be long term oriented and stay the course to accomplish 
the desired result. Projects need to be flexible to adapt to changing market conditions. 
Too much emphasis is sometimes placed upon immediate impact and success from projects 
[World Bank 1990, pp 4-5; and Holtzman et al. 1992, p.18] 
Reforms need to be carried out in a comprehensive and logical manner. Partial 
reforms will not likely succeed. There is a premium on complementarity of reform actions. 
Reform of input markets and financial markets that likely will increase costs to the firm 
without reforming output markets will ultimately fail because of reduced profit levels [World 
Bank 1991, pp. 148-157]. 
Appropriate services, profitability and timeliness of services for input and output 
markets are fundamental to success. More research and education is needed at the local 
level to ensure the development of the appropriate services, the profitability from use of the 
services and the timely delivery of the services to farmers [World Bank 1990]. 
Market'liberalization and privatization can succeed. The private sector appears to 
have a comparative advantage in input and output marketing as well as other activities. 
Private firms can perform these services better and at lower cost than government 
parastatals [Wolgin 1990 and World Bank 1990]. 
Governments need to increase investments in infrastructure such as transport and 
communications, other public goods and "market software" such as market information and 
an effective legal system that facilitates the improved performance of the market system. 
Actual performance of most economic activity can be best performed by the private sector 
[World Bank 1990 and 1991]. 
Perhaps the best lesson from all the marketing projects reviewed is that "the clearest 
lessons relate to actions that should be avoided rather than to those that should be 
replicated. This may be because it is easier to say why something went wrong than why it 
went right. Successful projects tend to teach ambiguous lessons, while unsuccessful projects 
generally have lessons which are painfully clear." [World Bank 1990, p. 25]. 
VII. Conclusions and Implications for A.I.D. Investments 
The purpose of this section is to answer the six questions posed in the introduction 
regarding the implications of this paper for future AI.D. agricultural investments in develop-
ing countries. The ideas presented will cover the set of agricultural services defined for this 
paper, and will also incorporate the authors' perspectives on how investments in these 
services relate to other types of agricultural investments. The term agricultural services will 
be used for all aspects of credit, input and marketing services discussed above. 
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1. Are investments in agricultural services appropriate at all stages of development, or 
are they most appropriate during the early or later stages of growth? 
The literature reviewed seems clear: there is a preferred sequencing of investments 
in agricultural services. The first priority is to develop an appropriate environment within 
which agriculture will function. This environment includes at least three key dimensions. 
The first dimension is infrastructure. Agriculture cannot perform well unless some rudimen-
tary infrastructure is in place. As noted by Ahmed and Donovan (1992, p. 31), "The degree 
of infrastructural development is in reality the critical factor determining the success of 
market-oriented sectoral and macroeconomic policies in the developing world." There is 
little value in supplying credit or modern inputs to farmers if they lack the roads, bridges 
and transportation required to acquire production inputs and to transport their harvests to 
market. Subsidized credit or inputs can not compensate for nonexistent or poor infrastruc-
ture. The second dimension is technology. Appropriate technology must be available for 
farmer use. Figure 1 emphasized that the returns from using production inputs depended 
importantly on the response that farmers obtain from their use. Traditional technology 
offers little scope for a dramatic reallocation of or increase in resource use.3 The third 
dimension is'policy environment. Policies that directly or indirectly affect agriculture must 
be reasonably conducive for agricultural production and marketing. Prices, exchange rates, 
trade policies, and monetary and fiscal policies must provide producers with reasonable 
prospects for making an economic return if they adopt new technology, make investments 
and increase production. Otherwise, they will not take risks and try to increase production 
beyond subsistence levels. 
A~cultural services generally represent the second priority for ~ovemment support 
once a favorable productive environment has been created. At this stage, governments and 
donors can usefully make key sector-specific investments in the public goods required to 
support private firms engaged in farming or marketing agricultural inputs and products. For 
agriculture, this includes several investments such as establishing prudential regulation and 
supervision of financial institutions, enforcement systems for contracts and property rights, 
market grades and standards, and market and credit information systems. Investments are 
also needed in developing research and extension systems, and in the training of credit and 
marketing specialists, and in human capital generally. Furthermore, since private firms may 
underinvest in new innovations because of a lack of information or perceptions of risks, 
there may be a role for governments and donors to accelerate development by financing or 
directly conducting experiments in new credit and input delivery systems, institutions, organi-
zations and technologies. 
3 This point was demonstrated in the seminal work of T. W. Schultz in 1964. 
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2. Has successful agricultural development occurred in the absence of investments in 
agricultural services? 
No countzy has achieved hi~h levels of amcultural development without investing in 
awcultural services. The greater the level of agricultural development, the greater the 
variety and sophistication of the services demanded. Countries with a large land frontier 
have been able to rapidly expand by simply improving transportation and communication 
so farmers would be induced to bring new land into production through reductions in 
transportation and marketing costs. This occurred in the westward expansion of the U.S., 
the rapid expansion of wheat and soybean production in Brazil, and in the cassava producing 
areas of Northeast Thailand. Once the frontier is exhausted, however, these relatively easy 
gains in output must be replaced by improvements in yields on existing land. Yield 
increases require creating and using improved biological and mechanical technology, and 
the successful dissemination of this new technology requires supportive agricultural services. 
3. What was the rate of return to investments in agricultural services? Did investments 
in complementary subsectors pave the way for these returns? 
Unfortunately. there is little systematic information about the real rate of rerum 
realized from investments made in amcultural services in developed countries. Further-
more. there are few rate of return studies for the investments made by governments and 
donors in agricultural services projects in developing countries. The returns from man~ 
donor funded projects appear to be fair!~ low. and certainly lower than expected b~ the 
project designers. This conclusion is based on two types of observations. First, there is evi-
dence that many projects have failed to provide a sustainable increase in the supply of agri-
cultural inputs, credit and marketing services. It is hard to conclusively demonstrate that 
aggregate output has been seriously affected when credit and marketing services disappeared 
once projects ended. Secondly, project completion reports often note serious problems in 
implementation that presumably influence their rate of return. For example, the World 
Bank Review (1993d) reported a general decline in agricultural project ratings during the 
1980s and the problem was especially serious for credit projects. For 204 credit projects, 
23 percent were rated unsatisfactory. The score for credit components projects was even 
worse with 47 percent rating unsatisfactory. A similar problem was reported by World Bank 
for agricultural marketing projects. The re-calculated ERRs for many marketing projects 
are substantially less than the ERRs estimated during project design . 
.Analysis shows that an important reason for the failure of agricultural services 
projects is that agriculture has been discriminated against due to the urban bias of many 
policy environments. Firms and institutions supplying agricultural services cannot grow and 
become self-sustaining unless agricultural producers can prosper. Rarely do strong support 
institutions exist where agriculture is weak. Projects were implemented in many cases 
without first ascertaining that the policy environment was conducive for agricultural growth. 
The sequencing of government support has also been a problem in many countries. The 
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early supervised credit projects ran into difficulty because they were implemented before 
good technology was available for farmers to adopt (Donald 1976). 
A second cause for many project failures can be attributed to poor design. This has 
been the case with many agricultural credit input and marketing projects, and especially the 
frequent failure of agricultural development banks and cooperatives. In spite of the large 
amount of funds spent on agricultural projects, there are few examples of successful delivery 
systems for financial or marketing services in developing countries. The problem is most 
serious in those countries where agriculture is especially risky because of the natural 
environment and the lack of irrigation, insurance and other risk-reducing institutions. 
A third important problem for many sector-specific investments is that they fall into 
the public goods domain and require continuous government funding. Some government 
and donor projects have failed not because of poor design but because their sustainability 
required public funding that was not continuously available because of inadequate revenue 
collection. This is an important reason for the harsh criticism of highly subsidized 
agricultural credit projects. It is also relevant for marketing projects that require large 
amounts of ph'blic sector funding such as market information systems. Reforms in public 
administration must accompany sector-specific investments to insure that necessary revenues 
are available when donor funding is terminated. 
The success stories of agricultural development provide useful insights into the 
conditions necessary for a satisfactory rate of return on agricultural services projects. For 
example, the successful cases of production and exportation of high value agricultural 
commodities follow some general patterns (Jaffee 1993). These include favorable natural 
resources and macroeconomic policies, strong human capital, well-developed physical 
infrastructure, capacity to develop or adopt technology, prior or parallel development of 
complementary industries and a dominant role of the private sector. Governments have 
provided facilities and services which either have public good properties, or give rise to 
externalities, or exhibit large economies of scale. 
4. Is the private or public sector best suited to invest in agriculture services? 
The cost of credit, seeds, fertilizer, and marketing services normally should be paid 
by the user. Therefore, farmers should expect to pay these costs and are willing to do so 
when they are clearly profitable. Generally, private sector firms are best equipped to supply 
inputs credit and marketing services that can be sold for a profit. The weak performance 
of government banks and parastatal marketing boards suggest that governments often do a 
poor job in delivering many services. This is particularly true in countries too weak to resist 
strong rent-seeking groups and political intrusions in the operation of governmental 
agencies. On the other hand, there are investments in research, extension, and market 
regulation that are public goods. It is difficult for private firms to provide these services and 
charge users for them in order to recover costs, so they are the appropriate domain for the 
public sector. The exception is where private markets fail to provide services that are 
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socially desirable, such as marketing services for poor farmers. It is appropriate for 
governme~ts and donors to support experiments leading to new institutions or instruments 
better designed to serve these groups, with the expectation that the private sector will 
eventually adopt them. 
The lessons learned in this study point to areas of investment by governments and 
donors that may generate high payoffs. In the finance field, additional experiments are 
needed to test alternative designs of organizations to provide rural financial services. These 
include increased linkages between fonnal and informal finance such as the expanded use 
of merchants and traders to on-lend funds to agricultural producers. There is also a need 
to systematically evaluate the new types of village level banks and rotating savings and credit 
institutions that are attempting to lower transaction costs and lending risks by using local 
information to screen potential borrowers and enforce loan contracts. In the marketing 
fiel~ there is a need to explore improving price efficiency by creating commodity exchanges, 
and to increase the capacity of governments to improve supply and demand projections, to 
conduct forecasts for imports and exports, to provide market outlook information, and to 
conduct research and policy analysis. There is also a need to explore ways to increase 
cooperation Between the government and private firms in input and output marketing. 
5. Among the various agencies or organizations that implement agricultural activities, 
are some better suited than others in providing agricultural services? 
For this question, the agencies and organizations considered are banks, cooperatives, 
private firms, government agencies, and NGOs. Some a~encies have a clear advantage in 
providin~ services compared to others. Commercial banks have the best record in providing 
sustainable financial services, and in some cases cooperatives and credit unions have also 
been successful in developing countries. Credit unions have been particularly successful in 
some developing countries in the mobilization of savings from poor people. Most NGO 
credit programs are highly subsidized, however, and have questionable long-term viability 
without continuous heavy subsidization. Private firms generally have a better track record 
than government agencies in providing efficient and timely inputs and marketing services. 
Some cooperatives have been successful in this area, but many have failed. Several private 
firms have also been effective in providing technical assistance to farmers in conjunction 
with the products they sell. 
Historically, government agencies have provided the basic infrastructure of transpor-
tation and communication, and research, education and extension services. Today, more and 
more of these functions are being evaluated for privatization. An unanswered question is 
how well will poorer farmers be served in completely privatized systems. Governments will 
continue, however, to play a key role in setting the "rules of the game" for the private sector 
through regulatory and supervisory activities. A debatable point is the extent to which 
NGOs can really substitute for the government in providing public goods. NGOs have a 
comparative advantage in identifying with their clients, articulating their needs, organizing 
them into groups, and experimenting with alternative delivery systems. On the other hand, 
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the social orientation of many NGOs results in unbusinesslike and inefficient operations. 
Linking NGOs with government or other types of organizations may be a promising way to 
gain the advantages of both. 
6. Does the U.S. have a comparative advantage m assisting m the provision of 
agricultural services in developing countries? 
The U.S. has a clear comparative advantage in transferring the techniques and 
institutions necessary to supply agricultural credit and marketing services to those developing 
countries committed to a market economy. The U.S. is recognized as having built an 
efficient system of sustainable private and cooperatively owned firms that supply good 
quality inputs and credit and marketing services to a large and heterogeneous agricultural 
producing and marketing sector. Researchers have studied and documented this system, and 
their analysis is available for other countries to evaluate. Furthermore, many of the key 
participants in the sector are prepared to directly assist developing countries to design and 
introduce a system appropriate for their specific needs. Some private firms and cooperatives 
are already actively involved in making direct investments and transferring technology to 
those countries with the greatest market potential. 
In summary. there is a large scope for U.S. involvement in supportin~ a~cultural 
development in low income countries and emerging market economies. This involvement 
is not likely to stress huge capital transfers for infrastructure development. Experience has 
shown that where the basic economic environment is conducive for agriculture, the U.S. can 
help to finance sector-specific investments and design the technology and institutions 
necessary to provide agricultural support services in a market economy. The provision of 
a~IDcultural inputs and credit and marketing services will be especially important in those 
developing countries that have exploited their agricultural frontiers and must now tackle the 
difficult task of improving agricultural productivity. 
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